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Executive Summary  
This study aims to illustrate the discourses and practices of accommodation of cultural diversity in 
Turkey with a special focus on the response of the Alevis to the compulsory courses on religious 
culture and morality (Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi) and the ban on headscarf in higher education 
institutions. To put it differently, this report seeks to understand the meaning of tolerance shaped by 
particular actors and groups in a specific political context. For this purpose, this report investigates 
public policies and political initiatives proposed for the resolution of cultural diversity challenges with 
respect to tolerance and/or respect/recognition in school life. In doing so, we analysed the ways in 
which public policies vis-a-vis cultural and religious diversity have recently took shape.  
Issues Raised 
First, we examined the government’s initiative to accommodate Alevi claims with respect to change in 
the curriculum of the compulsory courses on religious culture and morality. In doing so, we refer to 
the discourses of various Alevi actors, who take different positions in responding to the political 
initiative of the government. Secondly, this study scrutinised the public policy and political initiatives 
undertaken for the lift of the ban on headscarf in universities, which have so far been unsuccessful in 
making a substantial change in the national discourse of laicism. These attempts have also become 
short of introducing a new discourse based on respecting and recognising religious diversity in higher 
education. Referring to the interviews undertaken with several different actors, we reveal that there is 
a common belief that all these attempts made by political parties have just been politicizing the 
headscarf issue without making any substantial improvement for the resolution of the ongoing 
problem.  
Methodology 
Twenty in-depth interviews were conducted with relevant individuals, experts, parents, students, 
teachers, community leaders and lawyers. These interviews were scrutinized through the Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA). This means that the interviews were critically explored by the researchers 
in order to locate each of them into the right spot of the discursive map. In the mean time, an extensive 
literature review was also made in order to position the acts of speeches of the interlocutors along with 
the literature. 
AKP’s Alevi Initiative and Curricula of the Courses 
It was found out that the attempts made for the revision of the curriculum in the compulsory courses 
on religious culture and morality do not necessarily bring about respect and recognition for the Alevi 
culture as a distinct and peculiar identity in school life. However, it means to some Alevi groups that 
the participation of Alevi children is tolerated, and religious differences of the Alevis are accepted by 
means of incorporating Alevi belief into the curriculum and textbooks. This initiative cannot be 
regarded as a public policy, which effectively responds to the Alevi claims along with the respect and 
recognition of the Alevi identity in the framework of more rigorous problems/issues arising from the 
religious difference of Alevis such as places of worship (cemeevi) and the alleged legal status within 
the Directorate of Religious Affairs. Furthermore, the issue of education on Alevi belief should be 
discussed more in the public space with respect to the freedom of faith in general.    
Lifting the Ban on Headscarf in Universities: Right to Education 
It was revealed that most of the interlocutors regard the public policies and political initiatives 
proposed for the resolution of the headscarf issue in universities by making new legal changes or by 
reinstating and enforcing the laws to re-assure the right to education, as palliative solutions. However, 
it was mostly claimed that in order to resolve this issue with an address to tolerance, respect and 
recognition, a more structural solution should be found on the basis of right to freedom of religion. 
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Accordingly, those interviewed have expressed their willingness to see a constitutional reform to 
clearly make sure that headscarf ban will no longer be an obstacle before the right to education of 
individuals, to precisely highlight the right to religious difference, and to prevent the politicization of 
the headscarf issue.  
Freedom of Religion: Tolerance, or Equality? 
This study claims that although the government’s initiative may be regarded as an attempt to tolerate 
religious differences of the Alevis in school life, the inclusion of Alevi belief in the curriculum of the 
compulsory courses does not lead to the recognition of Alevi culture as a unique entity. The end result 
is to try to identify Alevism with Islam in a way that undermines the claims of a great number of Alevi 
associations. Similarly, one could also see that even though the public policy and political initiatives 
for lifting the ban on headscarf in universities intend to tolerate the self-presentation of headscarfed 
women in universities and to assure their right to education, they are far from resolving the headscarf 
issue with reference to the freedom of religion. 
Laicism: Infidelity, or Piety? 
It seems that the most crucial impact of strict laicism in Turkey is that it polarizes and diffuses the 
society between laicists, who comply with the state’s principles and interests, and Islamists, who 
challenge the state and the regime with their social and individual preferences. In fact, this study has 
found out that the state-centric process of secularization divides the society between citizens and non-
citizens. Since the state discourse of laicism is imposed on individuals, the individuals have 
internalized the state’s control over their religious claims. It seems that top-down simple 
modernization run by the state has created believers of Laicism on the one hand, and believers of 
Islam on the other.  
Following the French model of laicité, the choice of the early Republicans on the integration of the 
principle of Laicism into the Turkish Constitution in 1937 indicates that the Kemalist elite was not 
preoccupied at all with the elimination of religion from public space. On the contrary, they affirmed 
the fact that Turkish society was religious in essence. The main rationale behind the principle of 
Laicism was not to wage war against Islam, but to provide the people with the power to challenge the 
rising authority of the Islamic clergy since the late 18
th
 century. Laicism derives from the French word 
lai (or laique, in contemporary usage, lay people in English, or inananlar in Turkish), meaning “of the 
people” as distinguished from “the clergy”.  
Hence, laicism underscores the distinction between lay members of a church and its clergy. In other 
words, Laicism in a way rescued Islam as a matter of ‘belief’ and ‘conscience’ by institutionally 
supporting, financing, and promulgating a different version of Islam and its view of relation to power 
and social life. The separation of religion from its previous position of influence in the Ottoman 
Empire constituted a shift in Islam’s institutional and legitimation position, not its formal, full 
elimination. 
In this sense, rather than antagonizing Islam, laicism simply means to empower the individual 
believers vis-a-vis the clergy. Furthermore, laicist ideology has also made it possible that the Kemalist 
elite politically and culturally instrumentalised Islam to unify the nation through the institutions of the 
Ministry of Education and the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). The perception that Laicism 
(Laiklik in Turkish) was “antireligious secularism” ignores the regime’s religious policy, and fails to 
consider the existence of different versions of political Islam in Turkey, one of them enshrined in 
power until very recently and others outside it. 
Secularism and Laicism: Are they the same? 
The terms laicism and secularism are often interchangeably used in Turkey. Both terms rather have 
different etymologies, institutional histories, and normative theoretical implications. Secularism 
derives from the Latin saeculum, meaning generation or age, and originally meant “of the world” 
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(dünyevi in Turkish) as opposed to “of the church” (ruhani in Turkish). Hence, the term “secular” 
differentiates between matters of religiosity and matters of the world. In this sense, secularization of a 
society simply refers to the “diminution of the social significance of religion” and “the growing 
tendency to do without religion”. A secular state then refers to a “religion-free” state - a kind of state 
that does not apparently comply with the modern Turkish state. In this sense, Laicism is actually a 
kind of obstacle to secularization as it has so far made the state to instrumentalise religion as a tool to 
control the masses. 
This study concludes that laicist/religious divide has so far been ideologically manipulated by both 
pro-liaicist and pro-Islamist political elite. The political obsession with religion, as displayed by both 
Laicism and Islamism, tends to distract the masses from social and economic problems by turning 
them into a rhetorical debate about existential and societal fears. One could clearly see that the 
theological and political debates around Laicism and Islamism cannot be isolated from the socio-
economic realities in which they are situated. The rise of an Islamic bourgeoisie with roots in 
Anatolian culture, the re-Islamization of society and politics in everyday life through the debates on 
headscarf issue and Alevism, the emergence of consumerist lifestyles not only among the secular 
segments of the Turkish society, but also among the Islamists, and finally the weakening of the 
legitimacy of the Turkish military as the guardian of national unity and the laicist order are all very 
important aspects of the ways in which the Turkish society and politics have radically transformed in 
the last two decades.  
Thus, one should certainly try to assess the social and political change in Turkey without falling into 
the trap essentializing the Laicist-Islamist divide. This research has partly revealed that both laicist and 
Islamist discourses have so far been used by Turkish political elite as two different forms of ideology 
in order to conceal social, economic and political issues prevalent in the society by means of 
institutions, procedures, analyses, debates, and reflections. 
Keywords  
Nationalism, laicism, republicanism, secularism, freedom of religion, religious symbols, tolerance, 
recognition, respect, Alevism, headscarf. 
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Embodiment of Tolerance in Discourses and Practices  
Addressing Cultural Diversity in Schools:  
Alevi Claims on the Compulsory Courses on Religious Culture and Morality, and  
Headscarf Issue in Higher Education 
 
 
Introduction 
Turkey has a very intricate history with regard to the culture of tolerance. The multiculturalist millet 
system certainly praised the act of tolerance during the heydays of the Ottoman Empire, while the 
nationalist rhetoric promoted a homogeneous nation based on Sunni-Muslim-Turkish elements. Since 
the late 19
th
 century, indoctrination of the members of the nation was undertaken through the 
citizenship education. Hence, one could trace the footsteps of the culture of (in-)tolerance in Turkey 
through citizenship education. Üstel (2004)’s study on the citizenship education during the Ottoman 
Empire and subsequently during the Turkish Republic proves that there has always been a continuous 
indoctrination of individuals in terms of their duties towards the state. Üstel (2004) argues that the 
state has used ethnicity, culture, history, religion the like to create a sense of homogenous national 
identity.  
Kemalist education has certainly made a radical change in the mind-set of the Turkish citizens, who 
were before the members of the Ottoman umma (community of Muslims). However, scientific studies 
reveal that Kemalist Turkish secularism has been used to reinstrumentalize Islam in the service of 
secularist nationalism to foster a holistic citizenship instead of liberating individual subjects (Davison, 
1998; Mardin, 1973, 1989; Türkmen, 2009). Turkish secularism and its relationship to Islam indicate 
that there is continuity between the Ottoman state and modern Turkey in the sense that the temporal 
authority supersedes the religious authority (Inalcık, 1958). Turkish modernity is certainly based on 
secular premises. However, the aim of the Turkish form of secularism has never become to 
accommodate the political authority and Islam, it has rather become to maintain the religious authority 
under the reign of secularism (Türkmen, 2009; Bayar, 2009; Gürbey, 2009). The place of religion in 
Turkish national education has always been evident since the very early days of the Republic in the 
1920s.
1
 
The emphasis on religion in the Turkish national education has never changed. The integration of 
secularism and religion was perceived to be the main goal of the curriculum by the nation-builders. 
However, the objectives of citizenship education show some differences in the history of the Republic. 
Drawing upon Üstel’s work among others, Çayır and Gürkaynak (2008: 51) argue that the objectives 
of citizenship education have gradually changed:  
“In 1926 the new primary school program stated its objective as ‘raising good citizens’, the 
1929 program as ‘raising people, physically and psychologically fit to be Turkish citizens’, the 
1936 program as ‘raising republican, statist, secular, revolutionary citizens’.”  
The Turkish national oath, which is still being repeated at the primary and secondary levels, is a great 
example of this constant process of indoctrination. Since it was written by Resit Galip in 1933, the 
oath is ingrained in the back of the minds of the Turks with the last sentence "How happy is the one 
                                                     
1 For the embeddedness of religion in the modern Turkish national education since the very early days of the Republic see 
Bayar (2009). Bayar very eloquently explains the debates undertaken in the Turkish Grand National Assembly in the 
1920s and 1930s concluding that Turkish Ministry of National Education was always tempted to religious and secular 
teachibng together, but not to secularize the social and political system. Emphasizing the importance of the Islamic 
character of the modern Turkish nation, Gürbey (2009) gives several examples from the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s. For 
instance, while during the Turkish-Greek pupulation exchange Turkish speaking Christian Karamans were forced to 
emigrate in the 1920s, the immigration demands of Turkish speaking Christians in Moldova denied. Religion but not the 
language and ethnicity was the main driving force behind the making of the nation. 
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who calls himself/herself a Turk!" (Ne mutlu Türküm diyene!).
2
 Üstel argues that one of the most 
significant changes in citizenship education was held in the late 1930s, with the primary school 
program introduced by the ruling single party, Republican People’s Party (CHP). Accordingly, 
primary schools became the production sites for ‘milli yurttaş’ (national citizen) leading to the 
production of a homogenous nation (Üstel, 2004:138). 
The Turkish national education curriculum has always promoted a civic education based on the 
celebration of the Sunni-Islam-Turkish culture. It has been very difficult for the non-Sunni-Muslim-
Turkish students to publicly express their identities in school as well as getting their practical claims 
about their ethno-cultural and religious difference accommodated by the state. Research on the 
minorities reveals the difficulties experienced by non-Muslim, non-Sunni, and non-Turkish students in 
everyday life (Yıldız, 2001). Although ethno-cultural and religious identities are now being expressed 
rather freely in the public space, there are still barriers before the expression of one’s ethno-cultural 
and religious identity. To illustrate this problem, in September 2010, the Kurdish origin Democratic 
Society Party (DTP) decided to boycott the first week of the primary and secondary school education 
in order to make their point about the right to education in their own language that is other Turkish. 
The Ministry of National Education introduced new reforms, in the last decade, in order to redesign 
the whole curriculum on the basis of a constructivist paradigm as opposed to didactic education, and 
to develop new textbooks with a ‘student-centered’ approach (Avenstrup, 2005; Aşkar et.al., 2005; 
Sahlberg, 2005). According to the Ministry of National Education, the new curriculum “draws on our 
country’s cultural, historical, and moral tenets, and aims to maintain the Turkish Republic,” And the 
new curriculum adopts “the norms, aims and educational stance of the European Union” (TTKB, 
2009). The terms ‘tolerance’, ‘human rights’, and ‘Europeanization’ are also explicitly stated in these 
reforms as well as the revitalization of the Ancien Regime of the Ottoman Empire as in the historical 
figure of Sultan Mehmet II, who is portrayed as someone tolerant, protective and just vis-a-vis non-
Muslim minorities of the Empire (Çayır, 2009).  
Essentializing the term tolerance, the term was specifically mentioned in the textbooks of religious 
culture and morality courses with reference to the Medina Constitution, formulated by Prophet 
Mohammad to regulate relationships with non-Muslims, and Mohammad’s ‘tolerant attitude’ towards 
the Christians of Yemen (Türkmen, 2009: 91).
3
 Furthermore, in September 2010, the Ministry of 
National Education released a public statement in the first week of the school year 2010-2011 to 
underline the need for the ‘education of values’. Accordingly, the education of values such as 
citizenship, hospitality, solidarity and tolerance aims at empowering individual students against the 
challenges posed in everyday life by the processes of globalisation (MEB, 2010).  
In the mean time, the curriculum change made in 2007 and 2008 brought about some changes with 
regard to Alevism. The new curriculum focussed on different sects and diverse mystic interpretations 
of Islam. Alevism was mentioned among mystic interpretations as the main constitutive other of the 
course’s syllabus and was integrated into what is called ‘Turkish Sunni Islam’ in the book. This 
implies that Alevism was perceived and exposed by the authors of the book as a part of the Sunni 
Islam with some deviations. This intervention in the textbook was interpreted by several Alevi parents 
as a form of assimilation, and it was taken to the courts (Türkmen, 2009: 92), as will be explicated 
below in more detail. 
                                                     
2 The oath has recently become very problematic for the ethno-cultural and non-Muslim minorities in Turkey as the last 
sentence seems to have strong ethnic connotations with an assimilationist undertone.  
3 Türkmen (2009) successfully reveals the changes made in the curriculum of the courses on religious culture and morality 
between 1995 and 2007-2008. Refering to the changes made such as Islamization of the human rights concept, religionization 
of education, exposition of marriage as not only a precondition to establish a family but also as a remedy to adultery, and 
presentation of Atatürk as someone seeing seeing secularism as the basis for living the real Islam, she concludes that the new 
curriculum is designed to reislamize the Turkish society in a neo-liberal fashion. 
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In this report, we investigate two case studies in order to illuminate the examples of public policy 
implemented for the resolution of cultural and religious diversity challenges and the extent to which 
notions of tolerance/acceptance and/or respect/recognition are used. In the first case, we focus on the 
government’s initiative to widen the curriculum of the compulsory (REC) to include Alevi belief and 
practices. In the second case, we examine the public policy and the political initiatives undertaken for 
the lift of the ban on headscarf in higher education. The two case studies presented in this report are 
not illustrated as good examples of managing cultural/religious diversity in education and school life; 
but rather as examples of how the government seeks to resolve cultural diversity tensions in school life 
through palliative and situational solutions. We argue that although the government’s initiative may 
be regarded as an attempt to tolerate religious differences of the Alevis in school life, the inclusion of 
Alevi belief in the curriculum of the compulsory REC does not lead to the recognition of Alevi culture 
as a unique entity. Similarly, we contend that even though the public policy and political initiatives for 
the lift of the ban on headscarf in universities intend to tolerate the self-presentation of headscarfed 
women in higher education and to assure their right to education, they are far from resolving the 
headscarf issue with reference to the freedom of religion. 
Data and Methods 
This report is based on desk-research as well as field work. We have collected relevant data and 
information about the two cases through a study on NGO reports, policy documents, public 
statements, internet news and a wide range of books and articles enlisted in the academic literature. 
Fieldwork was conducted between the end of February and mid-April 2011. We have conducted 
nineteen semi-structured qualitative interviews, nine of which were conducted on the first case 
(compulsory course on religious culture and morality), and ten of which were conducted on the second 
case (the lift of the ban on headscarf in universities). Among these interviews, thirteen were conducted 
with experts including civil society leaders, policy makers, politicians, bureaucrats, and academics and 
six with practitioners and other stakeholders such as teachers, students, and parents. Most of the 
interviews were conducted in Istanbul, while four of them were held in Ankara with policy makers, 
politicians and bureaucrats.  
The final part of the field work was accomplished with the focus group discussion in July 2011. A 
group of journalists, civil society leaders, practitioners and headscarfed lawyers had a heated debate on 
both cases. The focus group discussion was very constructive in revising our arguments and 
conclusions. The data collected through the interviews were evaluated on the basis of the 
interlocutors’ reflections on some common denominators such as tolerance, Europeanization, religion, 
secularism and laicism. These interviews were analyzed through Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
method (Wodak, 2010; 2002; 1999). CDA is a method of discourse analysis focusing on the 
investigation of the relations between discourse and social/cultural developments in everyday life. It 
views discursive practices as an important form of social practice contributing to the constitution of 
the social and cultural world including social identities and relations.  
1. Case 1:  Including Alevism in the curriculum of Compulsory Religious culture and morality 
Courses 
It is estimated that Alevis constitute more than 15 percent of the population in Turkey. Alevism 
demonstrates a variety of  differences from mainstream Sunni Islam. Alevis were silenced until 
recently due to the ongoing and unresolved historical animosity with the Sunnis due to various 
stereotypes. Alevi identity became publicized in the 1990s as a kind of responce to the rising political 
Islam in Turkey, and there are signs indicating that Alevism was embraced and promoted by the laicist 
military and state bureaucracy in order to balance the growing impact of the sunni-based political 
Islam. Accordingly, Alevis started to raise their cultural and religious claims revolving around four 
basic issues: a) compulsory courses on religious culture and morality in the primary and secondary 
education, which is believed to be promoting Sunni Islam; b) asking the state to recognize the Alevi 
communion houses (Cemevi) to be equal to the mosques as holly worship places; c) asking the state 
not to discriminate the Alevis in allocating the sources to the Directorate of Religious Affairs attached 
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to the Primeministry (employing all the Immas in Turkey and abroad), which is believed to be only 
serving the interests of the Sunnis in Turkey; and d) fighting against all kinds of stereotypes mostly 
expressed by the Sunnis. In this section, the issue of the compulsory courses on religious culture and 
morality will be analysed. Prior to that, some basic information about the Alevis and Alevism will be 
delineated. 
Alevism is a heterodox religious identity peculiar to Anatolia. It is practised by some Turkish and 
Kurdish segments of Anatolian society. Turkish Alevis used to be concentrated in central Anatolia, 
with important pockets in the Aegean and Mediterranean coastal regions and the European part of 
Turkey. Kurdish Alevis were concentrated in the north-western part of the Kurdish settlement zone 
between the southeast Anatolia and the rest of the country. Both Turkish and Kurdish Alevis have 
been leaving their isolated villages for the big cities of Turkey and Europe since 1950s.
4
 Alevis have 
started to publicly declare their religious identity after some tragic incidences in Turkey, like the 
massacre of 37 Alevi artists in a central Anatolian city, Sivas (July, 1993), and of 15 Alevi people in 
an Alevi neighbourhood of Istanbul (Gaziosmanpasa, March 1995).  
When Pir Sultan Abdal association organised a cultural festival in Sivas, which is historically divided 
between Sunnis and Alevis- in July 1993, numerous prominent Alevi-origin artists and authors, 
including novelist Aziz Nesin (not an Alevi), attended. The festival was picketed by a large group of 
violent right-wing demonstrators who were clearly keen on killing Aziz Nesin who had previously 
provoked the anger of many Sunni Muslims by announcing his intention to publish a translation of 
Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses. Throwing stones and burning rags through the windows of the 
hotel, where the participants of the festival were staying, the demonstrators succeeded in setting fire to 
the hotel. Thirty-seven people were killed in this fire, due to the indifferent attitude of the police forces 
of the ‘Sunni’ Turkish state. This was a very crucial incident which has led to the radicalisation of the 
Alevi movement in relation to the sluggishness of the state apparatus.  
Relations between Alevis and the Turkish state reached even lower depths with clashes between the 
police and Alevi demonstrators in the Gazi neighbourhood of Istanbul in March 1995. Gazi suburb is a 
ghetto which is dominated by Alevi residents. The hostilities started when an unknown gunman in a 
stolen taxi fired a number of shots against a group of men sitting in a café, killing one Alevi. Police 
were remarkably slow in taking action, and the rumour soon spread that the local police post might 
have been involved in the terrorist attacks. The day after, thousands of Alevi people from the Gazi 
neighbourhood went on to the streets to protest about the murder. The police and the demonstrators 
clashed, and fifteen Alevi demonstrators were killed by the police (Kaya, 2001: Chapter 3; Bruinessen, 
1996b: 9-10). These incidences have opened a new era in Alevi revivalism both at home and in 
diaspora in a way that has prompted Alevis to become more vocal in raising their claims about the 
compulsory courses on religious culture and morality, the recognition of communion houses as 
warship places, the allocation of resources from the Diyanet, and struggling against stereotypes. 
AKP’s Alevi Initiative  
From June 2009 to January 2010, the AKP government organised seven Alevi workshops under the 
auspices of the Ministry of State in order to deepen the dialogue between Sunni intellectuals and the 
Alevi civil society leaders.
5
 These workshops were held to hear the claims of Alevis on the religious 
and cultural based issues. In every workshop, Alevis raised their complaints and demands that 
compulsory courses on religious culture and morality should be annulled, and an elective course on the 
                                                     
4 For further detail about the Alevi transnational networks see Erman and Erdemir (2005). 
5 For more information for the last workshop held on 31 January 2010, 
http://www.cnnturk.com/2010/turkiye/02/01/alevi.calistayi.bitti.uzlasma.saglandi/561722.0/index.html , accessed on 
19.10.2010  
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Alevi belief and practices should be introduced.
6
 They further suggested that the content of the 
compulsory courses on religious culture and morality should not include stereotypes regarding the 
Alevi belief and practices. After the workshops were completed, the Ministry of State released a 
preliminary report concluding that all the citizens were in need of religious instruction (ERG, 2011). 
Although some Alevi representatives articulated their demands on the abolishment of the compulsory 
REC, the government representatives stressed that it was not possible and appropriate to respond to 
this demand in short-term under the existing social and political circumstances (Alevi Workshop 
Report, 2011). Thus, it was decided that the curriculum of the compulsory religious culture and 
morality courses should be re-designed with a perspective, which does not degrade any religious 
belief, and with an encompassing language, which is recognised by all social groups (ERG, 2011).  
Having concluded the debates on the compulsory courses on religious culture and morality in the 
workshops, the Directorate General of Religious Instruction (DÖGM) was assigned with the revision 
of the curriculum to include the Alevi belief (ERG, 2011). The DÖGM formed a commission of 15 
people consisting of Alevi saints (Dedes), intellectuals, civil society representatives, and academics, 
Sunni theologists and specialists from the Ministry of Education (ibid.).  In October 2010, the Minister 
of State, Faruk Çelik, who supervised the Alevi workshops responded to the Alevi claims, and stated 
that an expert commission has been working on the re-designation of the textbooks used in 
compulsory courses on religious culture and morality in a way that would include the teaching of 
Alevi belief and practices.
7
 On the other hand, some Alevi civil society actors, who did not support the 
negotiations with the government, continued to have protests/boycotts against the compulsory 
courses.
8
 Eventually, in December 2010, a meeting was held in order to present the revised curriculum 
prepared by the DÖGM to the Alevi representatives.
9
  
Compulsory courses on religious culture and morality was introduced in the aftermath of the 1980 
military coup. The aim of the army was to consolidate the role of the state in everyday life and to 
depoliticise the civil society. 1982 Constitution was also designed in the same manner to unite the 
nation through a nationalist and Islamist ideology. Considering the fact that the national unity was 
threatened by the social strife between the rightists and leftists in the 1970s, the military government 
(1980-1983) adopted a political project to enhance the role of the state in public realm demobilising 
and depoliticising civil society (Özbudun, 2000; Arat, 2005). For this end, the military on the one hand 
emphasized the laicist discourse, and on the other hand adapted a kind of state-run political Islam 
indoctrinating the young generations through compulsory courses on religious culture and morality in 
schools. Hence, the new constitution after the coup indicated the obligation of the state to ensure the 
religious education of its citizens. From the very beginning, the content of this new course (REC) 
revealed a Turco-Islamist spirit, reflecting the new political and social concerns (Türkmen, 2009: 86). 
A similar approach was embraced by the successive government of the Motherland Party (ANAP) 
under the leadership of Turgut Özal in the mid-1980s (Akbulut and Usal, 2008).  According to the 
Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution introduced by the military regime, “Education on Religious culture 
and morality shall be conducted under state supervision and control. Instruction on religious culture 
and morality shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools. Other religious 
education and instruction shall be subject to the individual’s own desire and, in the case of minors, to 
the request of their legal representatives” (Goner, 2005). Article 12 of the Basic Law of National 
Education states that “Secularism is fundamental in education in Turkey. Instruction on religious 
                                                     
6 Sol website, http://haber.sol.org.tr/devlet-ve-siyaset/alevi-acilimi-ilahiyatcilara-soruldu-haberi-17116 accessed on 
19.10.2010 
7Newspaper Radikal website, http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalHaber 
Detay&Date=09%20Ekim%202010&ArticleID=1022834, accessed on 19.10.2010 
8 Webhaber, http://www.webhaber.com/haber/06-10-2010/aleviler-zorunlu-din-dersinin-kaldirilmasi-icin-2-2268512-haberi, 
accessed on 19.10.2010 
9 Hurriyet website, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/16521327.asp, accessed on 10. 02.2011 
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culture and morality is included among compulsory courses to be taught in primary and secondary 
schools and their equivalents” (ibid.). The compulsory religion courses were called “Education on 
Religious culture and morality” and made mandatory for all Turkish students. Although the title of the 
course sounds neutral towards all religions, its content involves the teaching of a homogenous way of 
life based on Sunni-Islam. Therefore, Alevis felt that they were explicitly indoctrinated through Sunni 
Islam. Non-Muslim minorities could abstain from these courses.  
Considering the attempts to meet the needs and demands of Alevi citizens with regard to the 
compulsory REC, one should draw attention to the fact that the revision of the curriculum did not start 
with the Alevi workshops. The process actually goes back to the programme of the Directorate 
General of Religious Instruction (DÖGM) for the re-arrangement of the curriculum in 2006 and 2007. 
The DÖGM revised the curriculum of the compulsory courses on religious culture and morality for 
secondary schools in 2006 and for primary schools in 2007 (ERG, 2011). By these reforms in the 
curriculum, the DÖGM aimed to bring a more objective, pluralistic and critical perspective in the 
compulsory courses on religious culture and morality (Kaymakcan, 2007). To put it differently, the 
DÖGM attempted to eliminate the Sunni-based content of the course, and to make it equally distant to 
all religions and beliefs.  On the other hand, it was argued that the theological approach was still 
prevalent in the content of the course, and should be replaced with a comparative approach to 
concentrate on the history of religions. Therefore, it was believed that the curriculum still maintained 
some elements prioritising one religion over the others (Gözaydın, 2009). 
Eventually, Alevi citizens continued to bring the issue to the court on the grounds that the compulsory 
courses on religious culture and morality do not respect and recognise the Alevi belief (ERG, 2010). 
The parents of Alevi children claimed that the programme and the textbooks of the course conflict 
with their own religious beliefs and practices, and asked the court to exempt their children from the 
‘compulsory’ courses on religious culture and morality (ibid.). In order to acquire the right to be 
exempted from the courses, they appealed first to the administrative courts, second to the regional 
courts, and finally to the State Council (ERG, 2011). In some of the cases, the court decided that the 
family should be granted the right to have their child to be exempted from the course on the grounds 
that the curriculum does not accord the goal of the Article 24 of the constitution and does not respect 
the objectivity and plurality in the courses on religious culture and morality (ibid.). In contrast, some 
other courts decided that the curriculum revised in 2006 and 2007 does not violate human rights, uses 
a language beyond particular religions, and provides sufficient room for Alevi belief (ibid.).  
Winning Ground in the European Court of Human Rights  
One of the court cases, which became decisive on the drift towards policies and initiatives for a change 
in the national discourse to accommodate the Alevi belief in compulsory REC, is the case of Hasan 
and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey. In this case, the Alevi citizens brought their objections to the compulsory 
religious education to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 2009. The ECtHR found the 
claims of the Alevi citizens rightful since mandatory religion education was considered to be in 
violation of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Kaya, 2009). 
The ruling in the ECtHR urged that Turkey should come into conformity with Article 2 of Protocol 
No. 1, which covers the right to education (ibid.). It should be underlined that two of the judgements 
made by the court arduously required the national discourse on the non-acceptance and intolerance 
towards Alevi students in school life to be changed immediately. First, the subjection of all children to 
compulsory courses on religious culture and morality clash with principle of secularism and the right 
to education (Akbulut and Usal, 2008). Therefore, the course on ‘Religious culture and morality’, 
cannot be made compulsory if it does not teach different religious beliefs and practices. Second, the 
curriculum of the course is not objective, critical and pluralistic since it does not respect religious and 
philosophical conviction of the parents as it was claimed (ibid.). In accordance with the judgements of 
the ECtHR, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) revealed that “if the 
course indeed covered different religious cultures, there should be no reason to make it compulsory for 
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Muslim children alone; conversely, if it was essentially designed to teach the Sunni Islam, it should 
not be compulsory in order to preserve children’s and parents’ religious freedom” (ECRI, 2011: 27).  
While the AKP government employed policies to manage ethno-cultural and religious diversity 
through the EU reforms in the first half of the last decade,
10
 the claims and objections of Alevi citizens 
with regard to the compulsory courses on religious culture and morality were aggravated, and the 
number of court cases increased at both domestic and international courts in the late 2000s. Therefore, 
both the external factors involving the EU accession process, along with the ECtHR’s decision, and 
the internal dynamics framed by the rising claims to freedom of faith brought about a stimulus for a 
remarkable shift from the national discourse of non-acceptance and intolerance towards religious 
differences of Alevis to the acceptance of the Alevi claims on the compulsory courses on religious 
culture and morality. 
Diversification of Alevi Claims 
The government’s initiative for the revision of the curriculum to include the Alevi belief and practices 
was regarded by some Alevi groups as a change in the dominant Sunni-Muslim discourse and as a new 
practice of tolerating religious differences of Alevis. In order to respond to the claims of the Alevi 
citizens, who invoked their arguments in the courts at different levels, the government initiated the 
Alevi workshop, and decided to revise the curriculum with an objective, critical and pluralistic 
perspective. Those Alevi groups such as the Cem Foundation favouring the government’s initiative 
raised their expectations for the weakening of the Sunni dominance in public life, so that it could be 
easier to incorporate the Alevi-Bektashi claims into the established structure of education through the 
existing instruction on religious culture and morality. These groups were highly encouraged to expect 
some degree of tolerance and cultural integration in the courses on religious culture and morality as 
the government claimed that the revised course was to deploy an all-encompassing language, and to 
teach Alevi belief and practices. 
The AKP government achieved something, which nobody could achieve before. It has 
managed to include the Alevi belief in textbooks of the compulsory courses on religious culture 
and morality. The Alevi belief is referred to in different pages of the textbooks. The steps taken 
by the AKP government are very important. Ten years later, a child who finishes the high 
school would be familiar with the Alevi’s existence and identity. The Alevi culture will become 
more visible, heard of and familiar to the others. What is more important than the feelings of 
the Alevi children is that the Sunni children would be familiar with the Alevi culture, and 
would be able to perceive it without any prejudice (a top level figure in the Federation of Alevi 
Associations). 
One of our main research questions was whether the AKP’s Alevi initiative could be regarded as an 
approach to cultivate tolerance vis-a-vis the Alevi community and their different cultural practices in 
the society as well as in school life. In the interviews conducted we found out that some Alevi groups 
and leaders evaluated this initiative as a serious attempt to tolerate Alevi children, and raise social 
awareness towards different cultural practices of Alevis in schools. Furthermore, the proposal of the 
government to include Alevi belief and practices into the content of the compulsory religion course 
was interpreted by some Alevi representatives as an indicator of the toleration of the Alevi existence 
and participation in the school life. These groups identify themselves within Islam, and therefore, 
consider the initiative as a genuine attempt of the Sunni-based state to accept and to tolerate the 
cultural differences of Alevis.  
In this sense, we can  mark out the discourse of ‘tolerance’ inscribed in the viewpoints of the 
respective Alevi groups narrating that there is a relationship of toleration between the political elite 
                                                     
10 For more information, see the ACCEPT PLURALISM First Report of Turkey, “Tolerance and Cultural Diversity 
Discourses in Turkey,  http://www.eui.eu/Projects/ACCEPT/Documents/Research/wp1/ACCEPTPLURALISMWp1 
BackgroundreportTurkey.pdf 
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and these groups based on the accommodation of cultural differences of Alevis. In this relationship of 
toleration, the tolerator (Sunni-based government) desires to remedy the grievances of Alevis resulting 
from the ‘centuries-old oppression’ and to show their willingness to embrace Alevis. The tolerated 
(proponent Alevi groups) intends to ‘transcend the adverse effects of exclusion and assimilation’ and 
to ‘be involved in a process of negotiation’ for cultural integration.  
The arguments of the proponent Alevi groups and the relationship between the government and these 
groups can be interpreted in a conceptual structure of toleration. Within this structure, the reasons for 
acceptance and objection are reconsidered and articulated, and the reasons for acceptance balance out 
the reasons for rejection by both parties (Dobbernack and Modood, 2011). “...Acceptance is sufficient 
for non-interference without invalidating the reasons for objection... The forbearance of toleration is 
motivated by reasons that override but do not cancel out reasons for rejection” (ibid.:10, emphasis by 
the authors). In this respect, toleration becomes relational in the sense that both majority and minority 
groups reciprocally prioritise the reasons for acceptance, but do not remove the reasons for objection. 
Accordingly, the AKP government appropriates the reasons for the acceptance that are identified as 
alleviation of the repression imposed upon Alevis, and the allowance of the practice of ‘individual 
Alevi belief’ in school life.  
The specific discourse of tolerance that was implicitly referred to in this relationship of toleration is 
the ‘allowance conception of toleration’. However, the government preserved the reasons for objection 
that are articulated as the refusal to recognise a legal status for cemeevi (Alevi communion houses), 
and to secure the right to practice religion for Alevis as a ‘collective and public practice’. These 
groups want to have a course on the history of religions embedded in the formal system of education, 
in which Alevi belief would be taught under the banner of Islam together with the Sunni belief. In 
addition, they also adhere to the proposition of having an elective religion course on teaching Alevi 
belief and practice in more detail. In this regard, what the supportive Alevi groups argue for is not only 
acceptance, but also respect. 
In order to understand the reasons behind the dominant discourse on the non-acceptance of, and 
intolerance to, Alevi claims on religious rights and freedoms, particularly in the primary and 
secondary education, one should have an insightful analysis of the arguments made by the 
government. Initially, the government justifies its policies and practices towards Alevis’ ‘intolerable 
and unacceptable’ demands on the religious rights in compulsory courses on religious culture and 
morality arguing that some Alevis are inclined to produce a social and political conflict through their 
request for the abolition of the ‘compulsory’ courses on religious culture and morality (Final Report, 
2011). This point of view of the government can be classified as a discourse of communal intolerance 
of perceived illiberal cultural practices, which are harmful for the society (Dobbernack and Modood, 
2001).  
The discourse embedded in this view is that of intolerance towards the Alevi groups opposing the 
government’s initiative in their claim for the abolition of religious culture and morality course, which 
presupposes to maintain integration of culturally and religiously diverse social groups. The 
government’s position regards the Alevi groups in question as intolerable on the basis that those 
groups are intolerant towards other social segments, and offense them in their pursuit for cultural 
integration. Furthermore, the government tends to justify its intolerance towards some of the Alevi 
claims as the Alevis ask the state to exempt their children from the compulsory courses, and aspire to 
remain outside the public policies regulating the religious affairs (ibid.). The government also 
substantiates its intolerant position against the anti-initiative Alevi groups with the assertion that there 
is an inevitable social need for an informative course for teaching religion for the sake of social 
cohesion (Kaymakcan, 2009).  
Some Sunni intellectuals and theologians also support the revision and the widening of the curriculum 
to include the Alevi belief and practices as opposed to the assertions of secularists and some Alevi 
leaders that the religion course should be entirely lifted, or made optional. From this perspective, the 
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government’s initiative is very positive and beneficial since it intends to secure social cohesion by 
bringing children from different faiths together and fostering the cultural interaction between them:  
Alevis are diversified. Alevi intellectuals are not engaged in a serious search for the Alevi roots, 
and the traditional Alevi groups do not have strong connections with the modern world. Alevi 
culture is so diversified and complicated that teaching Alevi belief and practice to students in 
courses and applying it to the everyday-life is a very challenging task. Therefore, the state 
undertakes the duty of adjusting to Alevi belief to the modern times, re-organising and 
rendering public visibility to it. Alevi culture does not have a formal and official chain of 
representatives which the state can correspond to. Nor does it have a formal cadre for clergy. 
Therefore, the state has to think in the name of Alevi families as well (the Moderator of the Alevi 
Workshops and the coordinator for the Centre of Strategy Development at the Directorate of 
Religious Affairs, DİB) 
Similarly, a Sunni origin Secondary school teacher teaching courses on religious culture and morality 
also underlines the need for a compulsory courses on religious culture and morality with reference to 
the cohesive nature of such a course: 
Generally, I believe that there should be a compulsory religion course entitled ‘Education on 
Religious culture and morality’, because religion is a sociological phenomenon, whether it 
involves pious people or non-believers. A course on different religious cultures contributes to 
the foundation of social peace in our country and peace in the world. If this course is not 
taught in schools, people who do not know each other can become enemies. This course 
should teach about various religious cultures as the name suggests, and it should not promote 
only Sunni Islam. The curriculum of this course should be revised, and Sunni and Alevi 
children should be able to receive objective information about each other in a way that could 
lead to the strengthening of social cohesion in the coming years (a teacher of the course 
‘Religious culture and morality’).  
Drawing upon the viewpoints raised by these interlocutors, one could argue that the Alevi groups and 
Sunni intellectuals who are in favour of the initiative refer to a discourse of acceptance vis-a-vis 
Alevis in the sense that they retaliate Alevi’s grievances, encourage their participation, and stimulate 
cultural integration through ‘pluralistic’ version of the course. Claiming that “the state thinking on 
behalf of the Alevis”, the moderator of the Alevi Workshops places an emphasis on a specific 
discourse of acceptance that is founded on the political will of the government to respond to the needs 
of some Alevi citizens and to integrate diffused, informal and personal networks of Alevis into the 
majority society. Hence, Alevi parents and their children are granted an opportunity for social and 
cultural integration into the modern Turkish society by means of acceptance in school life, although 
Alevis are not accommodated into a truly pluralistic environment of education where they can interact 
with students of other religions on the basis of their own free will. 
However, from the perspective of the Alevi groups such as Haci Bektas Veli Anadolu Kültür Derneği 
opposed to the Alevi initiative of the AKP, the government’s policies to reinvigorate the compulsory 
religious culture and morality course through its revision and the accommodation of Alevi belief into 
the curriculum is not a genuine attempt to stimulate the acceptance of, or tolerance towards, the Alevis 
and Alevi belief. The resistant and dissident attitude of these groups mainly rests upon the argument 
that the political elite, in line with the republican discourse, aims to interfere with religion, and to 
control it through the Islamisation of the public sphere. Thus, these groups assume that the 
government attempts to assimilate Alevis into the Sunni social and cultural order by containing Alevi 
belief and practice (Final Report, 2011). In this sense, the government initiative merely reproduces the 
dominance of Sunni Islam and the assimilation of Alevis by revitalizing Sunni Islam in public life and 
incorporating Alevi belief into the official curriculum (ibid.). Hence, these groups desire to abstain 
from REC, and also assert that the compulsory courses on religious culture and morality should be 
abolished to ensure that neither the state nor the government intervenes in religion as far as the laicist 
character of the state is concerned.  
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Drawing upon the arguments and the critiques of the opponent Alevi groups, we analyse that the 
embedded discourse here is that of intolerance that is attributed to the approach of the government 
towards Alevis in its claim to promote the teaching of Alevi belief and to remove the repressive and 
discriminative practices. According to the interpretation of these oppositional groups, the government 
actually implies a discourse of intolerance towards Alevis since it does not secure the ‘non-
interference principle of liberal toleration’ (Dobbernack and Modood, 2011). Although this initiative is 
alleged to be a practice of interference with the religious instruction in order to assure limited cultural 
rights to practice Alevi belief, it can still be regarded as an act of interference on the grounds that the 
government is involved in religious affairs and teaching of a particular religious culture in a prescribed 
structure of education. In the AKP’s approach towards Alevis, the tolerated minority group does only 
remain ‘subject to interference’ (ibid.), but also the relationship between the tolerator and the tolerated 
is of ‘domination and subordination’ (ibid.). In this case, the tolerator, the dominant Sunni elite still 
holds the power to constrain the teaching of Alevi belief and to impose Sunni Islam. The tolerated, 
Alevi groups, are, on the other hand, still subordinated because the religion course is still compulsory 
and its pluralistic nature still needs to be secured. 
Incomplete discourses of respect and recognition: unfair conditions of cultural integration  
Considering the potential of attaining respect and recognition towards Alevi identity and belief 
through the government’s initiative on the revision of the compulsory REC, one should also raise the 
question whether the inclusion of Alevi belief in the content makes a substantial difference for Alevis 
in terms of enhancing their self-respect and self-esteem. In order to be able to talk about an 
institutional change driven by the government, which aims to break apart the prejudices and to 
eradicate stigmatisation and discrimination against the Alevis, the revision of the courses on religious 
culture and morality is supposed to assure respecting and recognizing Alevis’ differences in and out of 
school life. Toleration as respect and recognition considerably differs from the traditional liberal 
conception of toleration (Dobbernack and Modood, 2011). Whereas liberal toleration is confined to a 
legal and institutional change led by the intervention of the state or political elite, and toleration as 
respect and recognition requires a more complicated set of social and attitudinal changes (ibid.). 
Toleration as recognition goes beyond the minimalistic principle of liberal tolerance defined as non-
interference, and opens up a space where ethno-religious minorities could ask for public recognition 
(ibid.). In what follows, we will scrutinize the discourses of various individual actors regarding the 
role of the AKP’s initiative to change the dominant perceptions about the Alevis.   
The field research reveals that for some Alevi groups, who are opposed to the compulsory courses and 
to the revision of the curriculum as well as to the additional content about the Alevi belief inserted in 
the textbooks. It is raised by some critical voices among the Alevis that the selected topics to teach 
Alevi belief and practices do not truly reflect the very essence of the Alevi culture, which is very 
syncretic and heterodox combining pre-Islamic, shamanist, sufist, pantheist, and even Christian 
elements: 
If we investigate the textbooks from the fourth grade to the ninth grade, we do not see anything 
related to the Alevis. For example, as for the Pilgrim Haci Bektaş Veli [a 13th century Alevi 
saint], the book suggests that he used to fast, and became a pilgrim because he fulfilled the 
commitment of pilgrimage. However, there is no evidence to show that he committed 
pilgrimage. For this reason, we certainly think that the curriculum has nothing in relation to the 
Alevi belief as the Alevis experience it... Alevi culture consists of features, which are inherited 
from the pre-Islamic era. It also contains elements deriving from the natural life (an executive 
member of the Haci Bektas Veli Anadolu Cultural Foundation). 
Moreover, the opponents of the initiative criticised the attempt to include Alevi belief in the 
curriculum and pointed out to the constraints of teaching Alevi belief in relation to the complex, 
mystic and diversified character of the Alevi culture. It should be acknowledged that through 
centuries, Alevi belief evolved as an oral tradition and has become highly syncretic and eclectic 
(Subaşı, 2009).  
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It should be questioned which variation of the Alevi belief would be taught in the compulsory 
courses on religious culture and morality. There is a notion in Alevi belief implying that the 
pathway of Alevis is the same but leading through that pathway differs widely in tradition (Yol 
bir, sürek binbir: Destination is the same, paths differ). Which one of these variations will be 
inserted in the textbooks? Thus, the inclusion of Alevi belief will solely trigger the conflict and 
distinctions between religions (an executive member of the Hubyar Sultan Association of Alevi 
Culture and an Alevi parent who won the case in the State Council with regard to the 
exemption of his child from the compulsory religion course).   
By the above mentioned propositions put forward in the interviews, the representatives of the 
opponent Alevi associations underline that this initiative leads to the reproduction of the nationalist 
discourse on the dominance and oneness of Sunni Islamic belief, and exacerbates the social conflict 
arising from the religious and cultural differences of the Alevis. According to these Alevi 
organisations, since the Alevi belief is supposed to be taught in the compulsory courses only as 
chapters explaining different Sufi interpretations within the mainstream Sunni Islam, this initiative 
may also be perceived as an attempt to teach Alevi belief as ‘an indispensible part of Islam’ in order to 
eliminate the contesting discourse that ‘Alevism deviates from the mainstream Islam’.  Hence, these 
groups perceive the attempt of the AKP as a way of Islamizing Alevism. 
In their account, the initiative is denounced because it does not prove to be a genuine and serious step 
to understand what Alevism is all about. For this reason, the government’s willingness to approach the 
Alevis and to remedy the mistakes of the past is not convincing and sincere. Should the government 
contain Alevi belief within a religious culture and morality course, which is primarily designed to 
teach Sunni Islam, the revision of the course is unlikely to drive and motivate a substantial change in 
majority-minority relations. These groups perceive the acts of the AKP as a practice of ‘toleration 
without respect and recognition’. They argue that the government should propose more egalitarian 
policies vis-a-vis Alevis in order to generate a respect ethics with regard to the Alevis.  
Furthermore, these Alevi groups critical about the AKP’s initiative underline the point that some 
Alevis are completely against the idea of teaching Alevi belief in schools in the first place. They 
maintain that the teaching of Alevi belief should be left to the parents and families, and the state 
should not intervene in it at all as it is categorised as a private matter:  
Religious education should be left to the private sphere. My child can learn Alevi belief and 
practices from me or from the saints (Alevi dedes) from whom we have traditionally acquired 
our knowledge for years. Today, Alevi belief can also be learnt in Alevi communion houses 
(cemeevi) in the cities. Alevi belief can be provided in the places of worship, which is an 
essential element of the Alevi civil society. If you incorporate religion in schools, religion may 
have a disuniting impact on students (an executive member of the Hubyar Sultan Association 
of Alevi Culture and an Alevi parent who won the case in the State Council with regard to the 
exemption of his child from the compulsory religion course).   
This point of view demonstrates that their demands and claims did not include the inclusion of Alevi 
belief into the curriculum. Rather, they asked the government to abolish the religious culture and 
morality course, or to be exempt from it on the grounds that it contradicts their own religious belief 
and practices. It should be also noticed that the first choice of the opponent Alevi groups is to 
eliminate compulsory courses on religious culture and morality. If that is not possible then they 
express their willingness to see the changes in the curricula of the compulsory courses, turning the 
course into a critical and pluralistic one in which Alevism is also accepted, recognized and respected 
as a distinct faith with its own peculiarities.  
The fact that the demand for the termination of the religious culture and morality course was declined 
has a significant implication on the means and terms of the negotiations. It implies that the initiative 
for the inclusion of Alevi belief is determined by the upper hand of the government and without 
achieving an agreement between all the actors involved in the process. One should also take into 
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account the fact that the representatives of some of the opponent Alevi groups did not participate in 
the workshops other than the first one (Focus Group Discussion). As a result, the decision on the 
inclusion of Alevi belief was made with the dominant role of the government and did not rely on the 
agency of the Alevis in general. Therefore, those Alevi groups, who are critical to the AKP’s initiative, 
argue that the government’s tolerance vis-a-vis the Alevis is far from generating an ethics based on 
respect and recognition. In contrast to the discourse of ‘tolerance’ as suggested by the moderate Alevi 
groups adhering to the initiative, the dissident Alevi groups portray this initiative as an attempt to 
foster cultural integration, the terms of which are designed and identified by the government and the 
political elite without consulting the Alevis through a fair negotiation process.  
This policy perplexes the knowledge about Alevism and the attitude of our children towards 
the Alevi culture... In the meeting, which was held to present the revised curriculum to the 
Alevi representatives, I asked the Minister of State whether our children would still be 
compelled to learn Arabic verses, Islamic prayer and fasting. Inserting some sections about 
Alevi belief does not mean that it is taught properly (an executive member of the Hubyar 
Sultan Association of Alevi Culture and an Alevi parent who won the case in the State Council 
with regard to the exemption of his child from the compulsory religion course).   
In this respect, it is perceived that any effort to incorporate Alevi belief into the courses on religious 
culture and morality would lead to the cultural integration of Alevis in inegalitarian terms since this 
course is neither critical nor pluralistic. The prerequisite for the accommodation of Alevi belief into 
the religious culture and morality course is that the course should be taught from a comparative, 
critical and pluralistic perspective even if it is compulsory. Therefore, in the view of dissident Alevi 
groups, the tolerance towards religious differences of the Alevis in school life through the inclusion of 
Alevi belief in the curriculum may also lead to the reproduction of the dominance of Sunni Islam and 
of the prevailing indoctrination of its norms and practices.  
On the other hand, the pro-initiative Alevi groups agreed on the point that the Alevi Workshops did 
not constitute an egalitarian and fair process of negotiations for the revision and the widening of the 
curriculum of the courses on religious culture and morality. As a top level figure of the Federation of 
the Alevi foundations argued in the Focus Group discussion that the Alevi groups supporting the 
workshops had some reservations on the revision of the programme: “At first, the government formed 
a small commission composed of fifteen Alevi-Bektashi saints (dedes and babas), intellectuals, 
academics, and Sunni theologists. However towards the end of the workshops, Alevi-Bektashi saints 
and Alevi representatives were expelled, and specialists of education, who were senior bureaucrats 
within the DÖGM were included.” In other words, none of the Alevi representatives were included in 
the negotiations regarding the REC, and the commission formed for the preparation of the new 
curriculum extended to Alevi belief was closed to the deliberation and argumentation of Alevis. The 
Alevi representative from the Federation also raised the point that the content of the revisions is still 
not clear to them as they were only informed about the titles of the changes at the meeting organized 
by the government on 12 November 2010.      
Drawing upon the arguments and positions of the proponent Alevi groups, we analysed that the 
perception about the government’s initiative is related to a ‘discourse of tolerance’. More precisely, 
the discourse of tolerance embedded in the toleration of the government towards the Alevi groups can 
be identified as ‘the allowance of conception of toleration’ since the government took a friendly 
approach to remedy the previous repressive policies caused by the Sunni dominance, and also 
‘allowed’ Alevis to practice or teach their individual beliefs in school life. On the other hand, the view 
of the proponent Alevi groups address at the discourse of tolerance in search of acceptance of their 
cultural differences in the public space. In particular, the discourse of tolerance they inscribe in their 
arguments also points to their desire for cultural integration in school life through the revision of 
compulsory courses on religious culture and morality.  
In contrast, the opponent Alevi groups are likely to perceive the AKP’s initiative as a discourse of 
‘toleration without respect and recognition’. They put forward two main reasons for this perception. 
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First, they assert that the initiative is not a genuine attempt to understand Alevi belief as a unique and 
distinct identity with its peculiar aspects outside Islam. Second, they see all the issues related to the 
practice of Alevi belief as a private matter. Hence, they demand the abolition of the courses on 
religious culture and morality. If it cannot be abolished they ask for exemption, and they protest 
against the inclusion of Alevi belief in the courses on religious culture and morality. In order to avoid 
cultural integration/assimilation reproducing the Sunni dominance and to be in favour of an initiative 
to accord more ‘egalitarian and substantive respect conception’, this course should be thoroughly 
transformed into a critical, objective and pluralistic course.  
Against this background, we draw the conclusion that the government’s initiative could not achieve to 
accommodate the cultural diversity of Alevis in the field of education since the divergent Alevi groups 
position themselves at the two poles of the spectrum ranging from cultural integration to cultural 
segregation. Thus, we argue that the only possible solution, which responds to the demands of the 
disparate Alevi groups, is that the government gives priority to the teaching of a course based on the 
history and sociology of religions from an academic and comparative perspective; and that the 
teaching of Alevi belief should be left to the private sphere.  
The analysis presented here about the ways in which various Alevi groups perceive the Alevi initiative 
of the AKP government in general opens the way to consider that not only the final outcome, or the 
specific policy measure, is important, but also the way it is implemented. Thus although including 
elements of the Alevi tradition in the textbook is an act of acceptance, the way this was negotiated in 
due course and the textbook change designed without the actual voice of the minority points to a 
minimal tolerance approach and paying lip service only to acceptance. This actually refers to the 
difference between toleration and tolerance. Toleration is the activity of enduring, while tolerance is 
the virtue (attitude) itself (Cohen, 2004: 77). This study reveals that the Turkish government shows 
toleration towards Alevis even if the salutation adopted is about acceptance, but not about respect 
though. But then the question is if toleration is enough on the part of the government without showing 
any sign of tolerance, recognition and respect. 
To recapitulate, it seems that what the Turkish government did with regard to the Alevi claims on the 
compulsory courses on religious culture and morality is to accept, but not necessarily respect, the 
minority claims. In other words, the governmental action regarding is resolution of the Alevi claims is 
not just a question of tolerance. Because, tolerance would probably be to prepare the legal and moral 
ground in schools in order to allow them not to participate in the compulsory courses. On the other 
hand, acceptance is about modifying the content of these courses. However, the acceptance was done 
unilaterally without truly including all the relevant partners from within the Alevis. As this is the case 
practiced, the government has not performed well in fully respecting the particularities of the Alevi 
culture. What some of the Alevis actually claimed was full respect and recognition. This case reveals 
that while the actual solution proposed by the government points to acceptance, the way it was 
presented by the government and bureaucracy was an act of toleration, but not of tolerance. Because, 
tolerance is a virtue, which needs to be internalized by the tolerator as Cohen (2004) eloquently put it. 
In the case of the Alevi Initiative held by the AKP government, it seems that it was the 
transnationalization of the Alevi claims through the decision of the European Court of Human Rights 
(2009) as well as the electoral concerns which made the AKP act upon the resolution of the Alevi 
claims on various issues including the compulsory courses on religious culture and morality. 
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2. Case Study 2: The public policy and the political initiatives for the lift of the headscarf ban in 
universities 
Between July and September 2010, the headscarf issue reached its climax when the head of the Higher 
Education Council (YÖK) claimed in his statement that the right to education is a fundamental human 
right secured by the Constitution and the European Convention of Human Rights. His public statement 
was sent to Istanbul University as a reply to the petition of complaint by a medical faculty student, 
who was compelled to leave the lecture room due to her headscarf.
11
 The YÖK also enunciated that 
expelling a student from the classroom on the ground of his/her clothing is an act of committing a 
crime of discipline. The leaders of both the leading Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the 
main opposition party, CHP, reacted to this incident with rigorous attempt to resolve the headscarf 
issue. The main opposition party, CHP, made a claim on the resolution of this issue by initiating a 
change in the Laws of Higher Education with respect to the right to education, although this issue is 
bound with the principles of secularism and freedom of religion, and requires a constitutional and 
structural reform. Therefore, it was debated between the two political leaders to establish a 
commission with a joint initiative and to discuss the alternative strategies for an immediate solution to 
the headscarf issue.
12
 However, from October 2010 on, the CHP, refrained from making an alliance 
with the governing party, AKP, in resolving the conflicts in the universities arising from the headscarf 
ban, and consequently, the initiative taken by the politicians reached a deadlock.
13
  
Another landmark in tackling the problems in higher education caused by the headscarf ban is the 
abolishment of legal arrangements restricting the entry of veiled candidates to the Academic Personnel 
and Postgraduate Exam (ALES).
14
 However, the State Council (Danistay) made a decision in January 
2011 to cancel the enforcement of the new legal arrangements, which made no restriction regarding 
the dress code in attending the aforementioned exam, on the ground that the new legal arrangements 
violate the decisions of the Constitutional Court and of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
on the headscarf issue.
15
  
The public debates and the literature on the headscarf issue in Turkey predominantly focus on the 
Secularist-Islamist divide apparent since the founding years of the Republic. Social scientists in 
Turkey often take this political cleavage as the central unit of analysis in their work. Their main 
argument is that the dichotomy between secularism and Islamism is an unintended consequence of the 
Turkish modernisation. The reasons behind the emergence of the headscarf issue were mainly ascribed 
to the political project of the founding state elite in search of the establishment of a modern and 
secular state, and to the ethno-culturally and religiously motivated opposition of the centrifugal civil 
forces vis-a-vis the top-down simple modernization of the state elite (Giddens, 1994).  In this view, the 
central themes embedded in the headscarf issue are the making of the Turkish nation-state, 
modernisation, secularisation, Islamisation, and identity-formation at national, communal and 
individual levels. However, in the search for a more insightful understanding of the headscarf issue, 
one should examine the nature and characteristics lying behind the modernisation project leading to 
the secularist -Islamist divide.  
In order to understand the linkage between the secularist ideology and the headscarf issue within the 
framework of top-down simple modernisation process (Giddens, 1994), one should look at the 
                                                     
11 Haberaktüel.com, “Üniversitelerde Başörtüsü Özgürlüğü Belgesi”, http://www.haberaktuel.com/universitelerde-basortusu-
ozgurlugu-belgesi-haberi-312491.html, accessed on 17.10.2010 
12 ZamanOnline website, . http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1037458 , accessed on 16.10.2010 
13  Internethaber website, http://www.internethaber.com/iste-chpdeki-basortu-savasinin-arka-yuzu-300769h.htm, accessed on 
10. 02.2011 
14  Memurlarnet website, http://www.memurlar.net/haber/179304, accessed on 10.02.2011 
15 Hurriyet Gündem website, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/16799756.asp, accessed on 10.02.2011 
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political context bringing about the headscarf issue. The emergence of secularist and Islamist divide is 
historically rooted in the political discourse of the founding elite of the Turkish Republic aiming at the 
establishment of a secular and homogenous nation. The Kemalist state elite established a modern and 
secular nation-state breaking up with the Ottoman state.
16
  For this purpose, the Kemalist elite 
undertook structural reforms securing a new political order separating the state from religion. 
However, the structural and institutional changes were not sufficient to build a modern Turkish state, 
which would presumably constitute its relations with the nation through a secular social ethos and 
reason. In order to form the state-society relations resting upon rational-secular form of power and 
legitimacy, the Kemalist elite pursued a modernisation project to transform the Turkish nation 
affiliated with religious, traditional and ethnic identities into a modern and secular nation based on 
Turkishness (ibid.). The Kemalist elite adopted significant reforms for the cultural transformation 
involving the adoption of the dress code in 1924, which rejected the veiling of women and any kind of 
religious symbols, and introduced the modern-Western style of clothing (Göle, 1997). The political 
project of modernisation and the state-led policies for secularisation partly were not completely 
successful in transforming the traditional and religious society into a modern and secular one.  
The state-centric secularisation and modernisation project imposed from above created a society with 
modern-Western-looking and rational-secular-thinking in the public space without dismantling the 
religious forms of social interactions. The strict separation of religion from the state as well as ‘the 
constitutional control of religious affairs by the state’ led to the generation of a laicist national ethos 
rather than a secular social ethos (Keyman, 2007). Following the French model of laicité, the choice of 
the early Republicans on the integration of the principle of Laicism into the Turkish Constitution in 
1937 indicates that the Kemalist elite was not preoccupied at all with the elimination of religion from 
public space. On the contrary, they affirmed the fact that Turkish society was religious in essence. The 
main rationale behind the principle of Laicism was not to wage a war against Islam, but to provide the 
people with the power to challenge the rising authority of the Islamic clergy since the late 18
th
 century. 
Laicism derives from the French word lai (or laique, in contemporary usage, lay people in English), 
meaning “of the people” as distinguished from “the clergy”. Hence, laicism underscores the distinction 
between lay members of a church and its clergy (Davison, 2003). In other words, as Davison (2003: 
341) put it very well: 
“[Laicism] ‘rescued Islam’ as a matter of ‘belief’ and ‘conscience’ by institutionally 
supporting, financing, and promulgating a different version of Islam and its view of 
relation to power and social life. The separation of religion from its previous position 
of influence [in the Ottoman Empire] constituted a shift in Islam’s institutional and 
legitimation position, not its formal, full elimination.” 
In this sense, rather than antagonizing Islam, laicism simply means to empower the individual 
believers vis-a-vis the clergy. Furthermore, laicist ideology has also made it possible that the Kemalist 
elite politically and culturally instrumentalised Islam to unify the nation through the institutions of the 
Ministry of Education and the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). The perception that Laicism 
(Laiklik in Turkish) was “antireligious secularism” ignores the regime’s religious policy, and fails to 
consider the existence of different versions of political Islam in Turkey, one of them enshrined in 
power until very recently and others outside it. 
The terms laicism and secularism are often interchangeably used in Turkey. Both terms rather have 
different etymologies, institutional histories, and normative theoretical implications. Secularism 
                                                     
16 Referring to the writings of Ernest Gellner (1994) and Joseph S. Szyliowicz (1966), we assume that the main shortcoming 
of the Kemalist revolution was rather not to try hard to reach out to the rural population. Both civil and military bureaucracy 
established clientalist relations with the local elite in the periphery without an attempt to reach out to the rural people in 
general. This is why the elements of a modern state such as secular education, justice and security have not really been 
institutionalized in the periphery; instead the state made itself visible there through an alliance with the local, patriarchal and 
semi-feudal big landowners. 
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derives from the Latin saeculum, meaning generation or age, and originally meant “of the world” as 
opposed to “of the church”. Hence, the term “secular” differentiates between matters of religiosity and 
matters of the world. In this sense, secularization of a society simply refers to the “diminution of the 
social significance of religion” and “the growing tendency to do without religion” (Bruce and Wallis, 
1994; Davison, 2003). A secular state then refers to a “religion-free” state - a kind of state that does 
not apparently comply with the modern Turkish state. Davison (2003: 344) draws attention to Laicism 
as an obstacle to secularization as it has so far made the state to instrumentalise religion as a tool to 
control the masses.
17
 
Against this background, in this study it is argued that Turkish laicism employs religious semantics in 
a way that actually constitutes impediments before the secularization of the state and society. This is 
why the debates about the headscarf issue have so far been held on a very ideological ground, in which 
the so-called Laicists and Islamists have been misrepresented as if they are in a constant binary 
opposition. To begin with, we seek to understand how and why the dominant national discourses and 
practices on the headscarf issue in higher education were produced and reproduced. In order to do that 
one should look at the political context of the 1980s and 1990s, a period in which strict laicist policies 
were implemented.  
Considering the fragility of social cohesion and national unity in the 1970s, the military government 
undertook structural changes for the enhancement of the state’s role in public realm in order to 
demobilise and depoliticise the civil society (Özbudun, 2000; Arat, 2005). A crucial policy of the 
military government for strengthening the state’s role in public realm is the establishment of the 
Higher Education Council aiming at the control over the politicisation of thoughts and debates 
motivating the left wing and right wing groups in universities, and at the eradication of the conflicts 
arising between them (Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu, 2008). In parallel with the suppression of the 
political orientations of both right and left wing groups, the Council was established to control the 
politicisation of cultural and religious symbols in universities. For this purpose, the Council took some 
measures restricting the way students dressed up in higher education institutions. In 1982, the YÖK 
banned wearing headscarf and having beard as they were perceived to be the symbols of religious and 
political identities manifested by Islamist as well as leftist and extreme-right wing students (ibid).  It is 
also essential to note that in the same year, a general regulation was made with regard to the dress 
code of the personnel employed by the public institutions (Cindoğlu, 2010). According to this 
regulation, wearing a headscarf for the employees working in public institutions was banned.   
History of Headscarf Issue 
Between 1984 and 1987, the government run by the Motherland Party (ANAP) pursued a practice of 
tolerance towards religious differences as a way of self-presentation, and the dress code was loosened 
up to include wearing a special headscarf, so-called modern Turban (Cindoğlu, 2010; Saktanber and 
Çorbacıoğlu, 2008). Nevertheless, the practice of the ANAP government, which put a claim on the 
modernity of the turban versus the traditionality of the headscarf, does not considerably differ from the 
discourse of the state elite on the national identity intertwined with the Islamic aspects of the Turkish 
society. In order to restore the social cohesion, the military initiated a political project for re-
structuring the national unity by incorporating conservative and Islamist sources of culture into the 
modern and homogenous Turkish national identity (Cizre, 1996: 245-246). In this respect, the social 
forces reflecting the new Turkish identity could have Islamic features as long as they did not clash 
with the secular and modern national identity (ibid.). Thus, female university students with religious 
convictions and practices could be tolerated as long as they did not challenge the modern and secular 
public realm of the Turkish society. Hence, it is pointed out that the headscarf issue could be tolerated 
in line with the political discourse of integrating the Islamist social forces into the regime, although the 
                                                     
17
 Niyazi Berkes is one of those Turkish scholars who used the term secularism in its correct form. In his book Secularism in 
Turkey (1978), Berkes defines secularism as an ideology used to differentiate the matters of this world and of the other world. 
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management of this issue could never transcend the framing of the dominant state discourse of strict 
laicism.  
Between 1987 and 1997, the laws regulating the headscarf ban in universities were changed. In 1987, 
the president of the republic, Kenan Evren, the former Chief of Staff, who initiated the 1980 military 
coup, intervened in the issue, and the Higher Education Council annulled the article about the freedom 
of wearing the ‘modern turban’ (Arat, 2005). Yet in 1991, relying on the liberal political context, the 
political elite made an attempt to change the law, and the supplementary article 17 of the Higher 
Education Law recognising the freedom of choice for dress code in higher education institutions was 
ratified (CEDAW, 2010). Thus, in the early 1990s, discriminative policies and practices against 
students wearing a headscarf in universities were not often practiced (ibid.). 
Considering the shifts in the national discourse on the headscarf issue in universities in a specific 
period, the political context in the aftermath of the 28 February 1997 semi-military coup brought about 
a turning point in the sense that the state elite and the republican -secular segments of the society 
firmly agreed on the marginalisation of the headscarf issue, which was regarded as intolerable and 
unacceptable. The reasons for the marginalisation of the headscarf issue lie in the association of 
wearing a headscarf with the politicisation of religious symbols in parallel with the rise of political 
Islam. It should be underlined that in 1987, the pro-Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) 
established the ladies’ commissions18 to replace women’s branches, which were outlawed  by the 
military government under the 1982 Constitution in order to constrain the mobilisation of the political 
parties (Arat, 2005). The ladies’ commissions provided a frame of social network for Islamist women, 
who could find a community to share their discontents about the modern urban life and to struggle 
with the deprived neighbourhoods at the outskirts of the big cities (ibid).  
On the other hand, it should also be noticed that the ladies’ commissions provided educated and 
qualified young women wearing headscarf with an opportunity to participate in the reshaping of the 
public space (Arat, 2005; White, 2002). In 1991 election campaigns, the party leaders attempted to 
transform the party from a traditionalist religious party into a mass party by changing its public image 
(Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu, 2008). In order to create a new image, the party used seven women to 
give the impression to the public that the Welfare Party was inclusive for everybody including the 
women (ibid.). One of these women was a young headscarfed woman, who could not complete her 
university education due to the headscarf ban. Since a young headscarfed woman participated in a 
political party’s election campaign and publicly articulated her aspirations to challenge the republican 
and secular regime, her wearing a headscarf was perceived by the public as an attempt to politically 
instrumentalise a religious symbol and as an ideological threat to the republican regime. Frustrated by 
the policies and practices of the Welfare party government in coalition with the liberal-conservative 
True Path Party (DYP) and the growing Islamist social movement, the military intervened in politics 
to bring an end to the rise of political Islam seen as a rigorous threat to modern and secular Turkey.  
On 28 February 1997, the National Security Council (MGK) gave an ultimatum to the Welfare-True 
Path coalition government to refrain from the Islamist politics, and this warning led to the collapse of 
the coalition government (Cizre and Çınar, 2003). Furthermore, the MGK meeting on the 28th of 
February gave rise to a new period, in which the MGK took significant measures to exclude the 
conservative and religious individual citizens from political, social and economic spheres of life and to 
restore the ‘laicist’ regime (ibid.). In this period, the MGK held meeting with the Higher Education 
Council and the university presidents/chancellors, and warned them not to allow the female students 
with a headscarf to get into campus (CEDAW, 2010). Hence, it should be stated that the measure of 
the MGK in the aftermath of the 28 February coup opened up a new period, known as 28th February 
                                                     
18  The commissions formed to mobilise women by Welfare Party in 1987 were deliberately given the name, Ladies’ 
Commission instead of Women’s Branch since the Political Parties Law, which was put in force after the 1980 coup, 
outlawed women’s branches.   
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Process, in which the concept ‘public sphere’ was dramatically constrained and the state-centric 
secularism became restrictive towards religious activities with fundamentalist tone.  
In 2005, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) made a decision on the headscarf case between 
a Turkish citizen, Leyla Sahin, and Turkey. In this case, the conflict between Şahin wearing a 
headscarf in a Turkish university and the Turkish state was discussed in relation to both the right to 
publicly express religious belief and the right to education. Drawing on the principle of fundamental 
rights, the Court decided that the interference of the Turkish state with Şahin’s education was rightful 
and legal, since the state intended to protect the right of others to education and to maintain public 
order (Kaya, 2009; and Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu, 2008). It was a monumental development that the 
Grand Chamber of the EctHR agreed to hear Şahin’s case at all, since two previous applications 
concerning the Turkish headscarf had been ruled inadmissible. In Şahin’s case, however, the outcome 
was a temporary defeat for headscarf supporters. The court ruled that there had been no violation of 
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion); Article 10 (freedom of expression); Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) and Article 2, 
Protocol No. 1 (right to education). In short, the Grand Chamber concluded that in the case of the 
headscarf, the interference/with fundamental rights might be necessary to protect the rights and 
freedoms of others and maintain public order. While the Chamber recognised that the ban interfered 
with Şahin’s right to publicly manifest her religion, it stated that the ban was acceptable if it was 
imposed to protect the rights of third parties, to preserve public order, and to safeguard the principles 
of secularism and equality in Turkey.  
Three years after the Sahin vs. Turkey  case, in 2008, the JDP government in cooperation with the 
right-wing party MHP (Nationalist Action Party) proposed a constitutional amendment concerning the 
ban on wearing headscarf in public places with the expectation that this amendment would lift the ban 
in universities (Kaya, 2009). Following the constitutional amendments, the newly elected head of the 
Higher Education Council (YÖK), Yusuf Ziya Özcan, made an announcement to the universities and 
stated that according to the constitutional change, the ban on wearing a headscarf in the Turkish 
universities was lifted. However, the Court ultimately repudiated the decisions regarding the lift of the 
ban with the consideration of the secularist main opposition party CHP’s objection to the amendment. 
Since July 2010, the Higher Education Council released a public statement to avow its decision that 
the right to education is a fundamental right secured by the Constitution and the European Convention 
of Human Rights, and that enrolling a university for a student with headscarf should be considered as a 
right to education. However, some public universities still persist on the suspension of the students 
with headscarf before their entry to the university campus or buildings, although most of the Turkish 
universities have recently abandoned the exercise of the headscarf ban on campuses. Furthermore, the 
headscarf issue is not sufficiently debated with respect to secularism, freedom of faith, individual 
rights, and freedom of self-identification in the public sphere. Another important point is that all the 
public policies and political initiatives regarding the solution of the so-called headscarf problem are 
confined to the lift of the headscarf ban in universities. So far no single serious attempt or initiative 
has been directed towards the lift of the ban in public institutions. Therefore, this work argues that the 
headscarf issue in universities remains as a challenge to the national discourses on modern and secular 
Turkey, and has to be resolved with an address to the re-configuration of the concept of ‘public 
sphere’ where religious and cultural differences of individuals are tolerated and accepted. This work 
also claims that it will be highly difficult to resolve the headscarf issue without dismantling the 
perception of the laicist groups about the headscarfed women posing a societal challenge is resolve. 
Reproduction of Binary Oppositions between Islamism and Secularism 
The state-centric laicism and the restriction of the public sphere are the central themes for our 
research, which has enabled us to understand why the headscarf issue has become so intolerable and 
unacceptable in a diverse society. One of the most fundamental questions of our research is to find out 
what lies behind the emergence of the headscarf issue. What is repeatedly narrated by the interlocutors 
during the field research is that the strict secularism of the state and the barriers before the freedom of 
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religion erected by the state lead to the emergence of the headscarf issue. All the interlocutors stated 
that the state’s strict form of laicism is not equally distant to all religions, and aims to control religion 
while it separates state affairs from religious affairs:  
Similar to the case in France, the Turkish state does not conceive secularism as the 
delineation of religion from politics but also it replaces the religion with another form of 
belief. Because religion is a source of power, the state aspires to use that power in order to 
control its citizens. If you are a woman, who is well-educated, lives in a city and has a middle 
or upper socio-economic status, the state wishes you to be a modern women and dress in the 
‘modern and Western’ style. If you do not comply with the requirements of the state, then you 
are compelled to concede your right to education (a former executive member of the 
Association of Women’s Rights and Struggle Against Discrimination, AKDER, and a lawyer 
on women’s rights)  
However, what is more important in our findings is that the most crucial impact of strict secularism in 
Turkey is that it polarises and diffuses the society between secularists, who conform with the state’s 
principles and interests, and Islamists, who challenge the state and the regime with their social and 
individual preferences. In fact, we find out that the state-centric process of secularisation divides the 
society between citizens and non-citizens. Since the state discourse of laicism imposed on the 
individuals, the individuals have internalized the state’s control over religious claims of individuals 
and groups. It seems that top-down simple modernization run by the state has created believers of 
Laicism on the one hand, and believers of Islam on the other.  
Public sphere is the main instrument of the state elite to impose the state-centric secularisation. In the 
aftermath of the 28th February, the most influential strategy that the state elite adopted to consolidate 
the state-led laicism and social groups was the designation of the public sphere by the ban on 
headscarf in universities. Since the self-presentation using a religious symbol in the public sphere 
contradicts the principle of laicism, wearing a headscarf in universities was stigmatised as an act of 
dissidence against the modern and secular state. Public sphere has so far been defined as the sphere of 
the state in Turkey; those who insisted on entering these places with a headscarf were not allowed to 
do so, and they were reduced to the second class citizens: 
The public sphere in Turkey is perceived as a space belonging to the state. Throughout the 
republican history, we have called hospital, university and school ‘the public sphere’. 
However, public sphere has to be a common space of negotiation for different groups and 
actors coming from the civil society. As Habermas put it very well, the language of the public 
sphere should be rational rather than ideological. If the language of the public sphere is 
ideological, the public sphere turns to be hierarchical (Professor of Theology in a public 
university in Istanbul).  
A similar line of thinking was displayed by another scholar teaching in a foundation university, 
underlining the fact that the public space is constructed in Turkey as a neutral and abstract category. 
She claims that the public space should be an unprescribed, democratic and inclusive space open to all 
the individuals: 
The public sphere in Turkey is designed as an abstract space to which you enter after you are 
refined from all your differences and identities. However, the individual carries his/her 
baggage of identity with while entering the public sphere. In fact, public sphere is a space 
where all individuals can produce policies by bringing all their differences in (Professor of 
Sociology in a foundation university in Istanbul). 
In what follows, we shall scrutinize the discourses on tolerance at the societal level towards headscarf 
as a form of self-presentation and self-identification in the public sphere. We shall also explore the 
discourses on the recent public policies and political initiatives brought up for the solution to the 
headscarf issue. 
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The question at the level of social tolerance towards the headscarf issue is dramatically important in 
understanding whether individuals and social groups approach the headscarf conflict between 
secularists and Islamists with respect to tolerance and acceptance. The majority of the interlocutors 
replied to the question in a positive way. Aggregating the replies to this question, the most obvious 
finding we achieved is that at societal level, there is no such problem as intolerance and non-
acceptance between veiled and unveiled women in terms of self-presentation, peaceful co-existence, 
and social-cultural interaction in everyday life. According to a research on the social conflict 
stemming from the headscarf issue, 71.1 percent of the research sample supported the freedom for 
wearing a headscarf in universities (Toprak and Çarkoğlu, 2006). In other words, there is no social 
tendency and attitude indicating the non-acceptance and intolerance towards the existence and 
involvement of headscarfed women in everyday life including the universities. A member of the 
Humanitarian Relief Foundation refers to the potential of the Turkish society to resolve those ossified 
problems such as the headscarf issue: 
Turkish society could be a model for the European societies in terms of the promotion of 
cultural interaction between different religions, sects, sufi communities, and ethnic groups. In 
recent years, the civil society organisations, academics, intellectuals and women rights’ 
activists drew a remarkable attention to raising awareness for the incorporation and existence 
of headscarfed women in social life (a female executive member of the IHH Humanitarian 
Relief Foundation, and of the Association of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed 
People, MAZLUMDER).  
Similarly, some of the interlocutors brought forward that one could easily observe the cultural 
interaction between veiled women and unveiled women among the lower and middle classes of the 
society. On the other hand, they further argued that we cannot talk of the same interaction at the higher 
levels of the society. One of our interlocutors addressed at the members of the military bureaucracy, 
judicial bureaucracy and the high-ranking public administration who have had a vested interest in the 
reproduction of the state-centric laicist discourse in their everyday life, which prevents them from 
interacting with the so-called lower and marginalised segments of the society:  
As the level of education and socio-economic status rises, the cultural interaction between 
different sectors of the society declines. For those people who attain a higher level of socio-
economic status, the space of everyday life diverts from that of people with a lower socio-
economic status. As a consequence, individuals begin to approach and treat each other with 
perceptions and judgements they create in their own life world (Professor of Theology in a 
public university in Istanbul).  
We claim that the problem which is deeply embedded in these contesting discursive positions is the 
lack of awareness about freedom of religion in public sphere rather than the degree of tolerance among 
different segments of the society. The definition of the freedom of religion in public sphere is highly 
contested. 
Tolerance, Respect and Recognition 
This section deals with the ways in which the interlocutors propose to resolve the headscarf issue with 
reference to tolerance, recognition, or respect. The interlocutors we interviewed were asked what they 
think about the public statement sent by the Higher Education Council to Istanbul University in July 
2010 underlining the right to education secured by the Constitution and the European Convention of 
Human Rights. We were also interested in inquiring the views of the interlocutors on the initiatives of 
the political parties vis-a-vis the public statement of the YÖK made in July 2010. Major political 
parties publicly pledged their claims on the resolution of the headscarf ban in universities by fortifying 
and enforcing the laws to reemphasize the legal respect/recognition for the right to education for 
everybody, and to eliminate the discrimination against headscarfed women in practice.  
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It was found out that most of the interlocutors perceive the political parties’ initiatives and the policy 
document of YÖK as a commitment made by the political leaders and policymakers to solve the 
headscarf issue in universities. To corroborate this position, they stress that AKP is very much 
committed to solve the headscarf conflict with respect to the right to education. They believe that the 
constitutional amendment of 2008 is an indication of this determination. We assume that this argument 
evokes the discourse of ‘toleration as an allowance concept’ (Dobbernack and Modood, 2011) in a 
minimalist sense. The discourse of tolerance deployed here reveals that the public institutions in 
alliance with the ruling party see the grievances of headscarfed students, who have been deprived of 
the right to higher education. In this sense, the ruling elite and the political parties involved in the 
process accept that headscarf cannot be an impediment to the right to education of female students, 
and thus, they ‘allow’ these students to publicly present their religious symbols and clothes. In other 
words, they achieve the minimalist principle of liberal tolerance, which is defined as ‘the absence of 
interference’ (Dobbernack and Modood, 2011). Thus, we argue that the positions displayed in the 
interviews with regard to the perceptions about the public policy and political initiatives to lift the ban 
on headscarf, address at the allowance conception of toleration expressed by the government to 
comply with ‘the principle of non-interference’ with regard to the right to education.  
However, none of our interlocutors believed that the solution to this problem lies in the political will. 
They mostly stated that they do not believe that the political parties can resolve the problem. The 
common answer we received to the question was that they do not want the political parties to get 
involved in solving the headscarf issue:  
I can tell for all the political leaders that they do not grasp the essence of the issue. They 
consistently debate about the headscarf issue in the public space along the lines of appearance, 
symbols, images and signs, but not on the grounds of ethical and moral communication. Even if 
the headscarf ban is lifted in universities, the debate would go on. This time they would begin to 
debate whether they should allow the students to wear a headscarf in high schools or in primary 
schools or to veil in different ways in accordance with different sects of Islam. The political 
parties do not discuss the issue in terms of freedom of religion. I do not believe that issues 
related to religion are freely debated in Turkey today. The state should recognise a space where 
the public can freely discuss the headscarf issue on the grounds of ethics. (The former director 
of the Women’s Activities at the Directorate of Religious Affairs, DİB and a delegate of the 
Democratic Party) 
So what she asks is respect for people. They should be respected and recognised in their capacity to 
solve this issue, and they should not be simply tolerated in the liberal sense by the state, which 
imposes rules banning (or not) the headscarf. Similarly, an MP from the Republican People’s Party 
(CHP) has stated that the headscarf issue has become politicized. She claims that the issue could be 
resolved if only it is depoliticized: 
The politicians should not be involved in the headscarf issue and other issues concerning the 
clothing of women. The issue became so inflated because it has been overwhelmingly debated 
since the 1980s. In fact, this issue could have been eliminated in the 1980s if it had not been 
talked about so much. This issue can only be solved if we let it go on its own way (an MP from 
the Republican People’s Party).  
It is worth noting that the arguments mentioned above underline that the public policy and the political 
initiatives to solve the headscarf issue in universities through legal and institutional changes are very 
limited and palliative. Furthermore, these solutions cannot eradicate the headscarf conflict with respect 
to freedom of belief. The arguments concerning the social attitude towards the public policy and the 
political initiatives also imply that there is a lack of the discourse of ‘respect and recognition’. The 
‘respect/recognition conception of toleration’ or ‘toleration as public recognition’ (Dobbernack and 
Modood, 2011) is not relevant here to account for the perception of our interlocutors about the public 
policies and initiatives. We argue that the initiatives for the lift of the ban in universities cannot be 
explained as a process of shift in the discourse from ‘toleration as allowance’ to ‘toleration as public 
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recognition’ since the stigmatisation and discrimination against headscarfed women still prevails 
although headscarf as a part of Islamic belief is no longer seen as a reason for objection to the right to 
education.    
A headscarfed woman who is a graduate from a private university in 2005 stated that unless there is a 
permanent and fundamental solution to the issue, she does not believe in the initiatives taken by the 
political leaders: 
In Turkey, such attempts have been made in the political context of elections or specific 
favourable situations. However, what I demand is that a structural and radical solution should 
be brought not only to this issue but also to the other issues related to the freedom of religion. 
The headscarf issue is a problem of everybody, not only ours (a professional working as an 
export manager at a trading company). 
One of the most significant findings we drew from these interviews is that our interlocutors believe 
that as long as the political parties are involved in resolving the headscarf issue in general, this issue is 
bound to be hijacked by the debates and conflicts revolving around the ideology of laicism. As in the 
case of the closure case of the ruling party, AKP, in which the party was accused of violating the 
principle of laicism, every attempt of a political party would face the risk of contravening the state’s 
constitutive elements, and thus, of being labelled as Islamists. Therefore, it seems to be more 
conceivable to claim that the political actors should refrain themselves from proposing legal and 
constitutional arrangements on their own to resolve the issue, rather they should contribute to the 
preparation of a convenient ground to open up a public debate around the idea of freedom of religion 
and diversity. 
Conclusion 
We presented two case studies in order to illustrate some examples of public policies and political 
initiatives deployed for the accommodation of cultural diversity challenges in primary, secondary and 
higher education institutions with respect to tolerance/acceptance and/or respect/recognition. One of 
our cases was the public policy and political initiatives employed for the lift of the ban on headscarf in 
universities. The other case was the government’s initiative for the widening of the curriculum of the 
compulsory religious culture and morality course to include Alevi belief and practices. It is revealed 
that neither of these two cases can be indicated as good practices of managing cultural and religious 
diversity in the field of education. The public policy, or political initiatives, employed for the lift of the 
headscarf ban in universities was not widely supported and endorsed by the public, because neither 
the public policy nor the political initiatives were seen as a solution to the headscarf issue on the basis 
of respect/recognition. Likewise, the government’s initiative for the extension of the curriculum of the 
compulsory courses on religious culture and morality to Alevi belief was not regarded as an attempt to 
dismantle the dominant discourse of Sunni Islam as well as the intolerance towards the Alevis in 
school life. Hence, it has fallen short of changing the act of intolerance of the Sunni Muslims towards 
the Alevis. 
Our research reveals that the government’s initiative to include Alevi belief and practices in the 
curriculum of the compulsory courses on religious culture and morality may be a solution to the 
religious diversity challenges posed by the Alevis. There are two dominant groups among the Alevis 
who are supportive and opponent to the AKP’s initiative. The proponent Alevi group highlights the 
willingness of the AKP to change the discourse of dominant Sunni Islam and their own claim for 
cultural integration in school life whereas the opponent Alevi groups do not find the initiative to be 
credible as they believe that that is far from generating a discourse based on ‘toleration with respect 
and recognition’. They assert that the initiative is not a genuine attempt to understand Alevi belief as a 
unique and distinct identity with its peculiar aspects outside Islam. And, they see all the issues related 
to the practice of Alevi belief as a private matter. Hence, they opt for the abolition of the compulsory 
courses on religious culture and morality. If not they ask for exemption from the course.  
Alevi Claims on the Compulsory Courses on Religious Culture and Morality, and Headscarf Issue in Higher Education 
 
 
Against this background, we conclude that the course content should be based on the history and 
sociology of religions without promoting Sunni Islam. We also conclude that the Alevi initiative of the 
AKP should not be regarded as a public policy, which effectively responds to the Alevi claims 
addressing at respect and recognition vis-a-vis Alevi identity in settling more rigorous problems/issues 
such as places of worship (cemeevi) for Alevis and the alleged legal status of Alevism within the 
Directorate of Religious Affairs. Accordingly, we propose that the curriculum of the compulsory 
courses on religion and ethics should be changed, and concentrate on the history and sociology of 
religions. Such a change could immediately create a cohesive society in which no group would be 
feeling threatened by the hegemonic discourse of Sunni-Islam. Furthermore, the issue of education on 
Alevi belief should be discussed more in the public space with respect to the freedom of religion in 
general. In order to pursue such an aim, more funds and time should be allocated by the public policy 
makers at both local and national levels to the research and development regarding the preparation of 
more egalitarian, more inclusive, and more elaborate textbooks to make sure that social cohesion will 
be secured without offending anyone with regard to her/his religious, ethnic, and cultural convictions.  
Similarly, we found out that the public policy and political initiatives implemented for the lift of the 
headscarf ban in universities can be considered by the public in general as a solution to the issue with 
respect to the right to education. Drawing upon our analysis on the public debates and the findings of 
interviews, we conclude that there is a social consensus on toleration and acceptance vis-a-vis 
headscarfed women in higher education. The standpoints on the public policy and the political 
initiatives embody the discourse of ‘toleration as allowance’. In this  standpoint, the discourse of 
‘toleration as allowance’ means in the public opinion that the leading AKP is committed to accept 
headscarf as a part of the religious belief of headscarfed women, and allows them to be present with 
this religious symbol in universities and to obtain the right to education. Therefore, it is indicated that 
wearing a headscarf in universities can be tolerated as a way of self-presentation and self-
identification. However, some other opinions were also stated by the interlocutors. Some blamed the 
AKP of not having made an attempt to lift the overall ban on headscarf in public institutions other than 
universities. Considering the discourses of toleration and respect/recognition linked to freedom of 
religion, which was placed at the heart of headscarf issue, we conclude that there is an ambiguity 
about the definition of freedom of religion. There needs to be further public discussion on the freedom 
of religion. These kinds of discussions could eventually contribute to the generation of a public 
understanding, which perceives religious convictions as a matter of private domain. 
The binary opposition between laicism and Islamism has also blocked the resolution of the headscarf 
issue, and framed the issue as a challenge against the security of the state. So far, the attempts to 
discuss the issue with reference to the right to education, the right to the public space, the right to the 
city, and the right to equal pay to equal labour have failed. This ongoing binary opposition has also 
misled the politicians, scholars, journalists and community leaders to perceive both sides of the binary 
opposition as homogeneous entities. Hence, this divide between the so-called laicists and Islamists 
should be uncovered by critical social scientists in order to reveal the fact that it is actually 
concealing subordination of headscarfed women by political parties, males and religious communities 
themselves. The educators should be aware of this dilemma while they teach in classroom in a way 
that tackles with the ethno-cultural and religious stereotypes, so that educators could be agents of 
social cohesion. 
In the Turkish debates on laicism there is little acknowledgment of the similarities between Alevi 
organizations and pious Sunni Muslim groups in regard of their opposition to the laicist regime, as 
well as in their demands for recognition of their practices. As Markus Dressler (2010) also put it very 
well this clearly has to do with the ways in which the knowledge regime of laicism juxtaposes the 
notions of modern and reactionary (irticai) religion as opposite poles in a binary opposition leaving 
little leeway for more complex and creative imaginations. The research reveals that scientific 
elaboration of the problems in democratic platforms leads both Alevis and headscarfed women to 
agree that their problems spring from the fact that there is no freedom of religion in Turkey. Hence, 
one should not underestimate the power of liminal spaces whereby Alevis and headscarfed women, or 
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Alevis and Sunnis, or Muslims and Christians, come together, as they have the potential be the fertile 
grounds of dialogue, respect, empathy, recognition and pluralism.  
Furthermore, what is also remarkable in both cases is the fact that the decisions taken by the European 
Court of Human Rights about each case made a great impact on the domestic developments regarding 
Alevis’ position vis-a-vis the compulsory courses on religious culture and morality, and the AKP’s 
position vis-a-vis the Europeanization process of Turkey. EU circles should be aware of the fact that 
Turkish domestic political affairs are highly shaped by the European judiciary circles. One could also 
conclude that Turkey is going through a process in which both desecularization and militant 
secularism are simultaneously occurring in a way that reproduces binary oppositions resulting from 
the way Turkish modernity is experienced. The collision of secular and desecularized ways of life 
seems to be the reflection of the social and political transformation experienced in the last two 
decades in the Turkish society.  
Eventually, one could conclude that laicist/religious divide has been so far ideologically manipulated 
by both pro-liaicist and pro-Islamist political elite. The political obsession with religion, as displayed 
by laicism, or the political obsession with religion, as displayed by Islamism, tends to distract the 
masses from social and economic problems by turning them into a rhetorical debate about existential 
and societal fears. One could clearly see that the theological and political debates around laicism and 
Islamism cannot be isolated from the socio-economic realities in which they are situated. The rise of 
an Islamic bourgeoisie with roots in Anatolian culture, the re-Islamization of society and politics in 
everyday life through the debates on headscarf issue and Alevism, the emergence of consumerist 
lifestyles not only among the secular segments of the Turkish society, but also among the Islamists, 
and finally the weakening of the legitimacy of the Turkish military as the guardian of national unity 
and the laicist order are all very important aspects of the ways in which the Turkish society and 
politics have radically transformed in the last two decades.  
Thus, one should certainly try to assess the social and political change in Turkey without falling into 
the trap essentializing the laicist-Islamist divide. This paper has partly revealed that both laicist and 
Islamist discourses have so far been used by Turkish political elite as two different forms of 
governmentality (Foucault, 1979) in order to conceal social, economic and political issues prevalent in 
the society by means of institutions, procedures, analyses, debates, and reflections. The last but not the 
least, this study concludes that the policy makers should not only be limited with the use of the notion 
of tolerance (hosgörü) in settling the societal, cultural and religious conflicts. They should also give 
credit to the notions of respect, recognition, pluralism, equality and justice in order to create a 
cohesive society. 
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Annex I 
 
List of Interviews: 
(All interviews are tape recorded and transcribed, unless otherwise stated below) 
 
The Revision of the Religious culture and morality Course to include the Alevi belief  
 
2 Sivil Society Leaders: 
D. B., male, engineer, 50-55 years old, the president of the Federation of Alevi Foundations, 
Istanbul, February 2011 
K. A., male, 50-55 years old, the president of the Haci Bektas Veli Anadolu Cultural 
Foundation, Istanbul, March 2011 
 
Policy Maker: 
N. S., male, professor of sociology of religion, 50 years old, the Moderator of the Alevi 
Workshops and the coordinator for the Centre of Strategy Development at the Directorate of 
Religious Affairs, DİB, Ankara, March 2011 
 
Bureaucrat: 
İ. A., male, professor of theology, 50 years old, the Directorate General of Religious 
Instruction (DÖGM) at the Ministry of National Education, Ankara, March 2011 
 
Parents of Alevi Students: 
A. K., male, accounting and finance manager at private companies,  41 years old, the 
president of the Hubyar Sultan Association of Alevi Culture and an Alevi parent who won the 
case in the State Council with regard to the exemption of his child from the compulsory 
religion course, Istanbul, April 2011  
D. Ö., male, 39 years old, an executive member of the Haci Bektas Veli Anadolu Cultural 
Foundation and a father of an Alevi student, Istanbul, March 2011 
 
Teachers of the Compulsory Religion Course ‘Religious culture and morality’: 
İ. Ü, male, 45 years old, a primary school teacher, Erzincan, Eastern Turkey, March 2011 
M. Y, male, 40-45 years old, a high school teacher, Istanbul, March 2011 
 
The Headscarf Issue in Universities:  
 
2 Civil Society Leaders: 
F. B., female, a lawyer on women’s rights, 30-35 years old, the former vice president of the 
Association of Women’s Rights and Struggle Against Discrimination (AKDER) and, Istanbul, 
March 2011 
G. S., female, a lawyer, 40 years old, an executive member of the IHH Humanitarian Relief 
Foundation and of the Association of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People, 
MAZLUMDER, Istanbul, March 2011 
 
Policy Maker:  
A. S., female, a theologist, 45-50 years old, the former director of the Women’s Activities at 
the Directorate of Religious Affairs, DİB, and a current delegate of the Democratic Party, 
Ankara, March 2011 
  
Politicians: 
G. E., female, professor of chemical engineer, 61 years old, an MP from the Republican 
People’s Party, Ankara, April 2011 
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A. B., female, a journalist, 47 years old, an executive member of the Justice and Development 
Party and, May 2011 (no tape) 
 
3 Academics:  
A. Y., female, Professor of Sociology, 45-50 years old, in a foundation university in Istanbul, 
Istanbul, March 2011 
T. K., male, Professor of Theology, 45 years old, in a public university in Istanbul, Istanbul, 
April 2011  
Ü. M., female, Professor of Sociology, 65 years old, (retired from a public university in 
Istanbul and became a devout Muslim), Istanbul, April 2011 
 
Students: 
V. E., female, a graduate of Bilgi University, 29 years old, export manager at a trading 
company, Istanbul, April 2011  
Z. S. D., female, a postgraduate student in European Studies programme at Bilgi University, 
20-25 years old, Istanbul, April 2011 
A. Ö., female, a headscarfed woman who declined in her studies at an undergraduate 
programme at Istanbul University due to the ban on headscarf in the 28 February Process, 32 
years old, Istanbul, April 2011  
 
 
Focus Group Discussion: 
(The Focus group discussion was conducted at Santral Campus of Istanbul Bilgi University 
on 9 July 2011 and fully tape recorded.) 
 
The Participants: 
A. K., male, accounting and finance manager at private companies,  41 years old, the 
president of the Hubyar Sultan Association of Alevi Culture and an Alevi parent who won the 
case in the State Council with regard to the exemption of his child from the compulsory 
religion course 
D. B., male, engineer, 50-55 years old, the president of the Federation of Alevi Foundations 
F. B., female, a lawyer on women’s rights, 30-35 years old, the former vice president of the 
Association of Women’s Rights and Struggle Against Discrimination (AKDER) and a lawyer 
on women’s rights 
H.K., female, journalist and columnist at a private newspaper, 25-30 years old 
Z.Ü.B., female, radio and TV programme productor, radio speaker at a private radio channel, 
31 years old 
S.C., male,  a postgraduate student in European Studies at a private university and a columnist 
at an online newspaper,  
B. Ç., female, a PhD student in political science at a private unversity in Istanbul, 25-30 years 
old 
H.D., female, founding partner of a private business on speaker agency, conference 
organisation and global publishing, 55 years old, president of a speakers bureau in Istanbul. 
 
Alevi Claims on the Compulsory Courses on Religious Culture and Morality, and Headscarf Issue in Higher Education 
 
 
Annex II 
Interview Guide for Key Informants 
 
QUESTION SETS: 
 
Question Set 1: The Widening of the Curriculum of Religious culture and morality 
Course for Alevi Belief  
 
Questions for Policy Makers, Politicians, and National Representative of 
Ethnic/Religious Groups:  
1) There has been an ongoing debate on the curriculum of the Course “Religious Culture 
and Moral Education”. What is your assessment on these debates? 
 
2) What do you think about the compulsory religious courses which are taught under the 
title “Religious Course and Moral Education” in the primary and secondary schools? 
 
3)  Do you approve and accept the way in which “Religious Culture and Moral 
Education” is taught at the present? Do you think that in these courses, students are 
forced to learn Islam, and to adopt Islamic beliefs and practices? 
 
4) Do you believe that in these courses, Alevi and other non-Sunni students are being 
humiliated? If so, can you explain how and why? 
  
5) How did you find the AKP government’s initiation of a new educational policy within 
the framework of Alevi question, which proposed a law draft to widen the curriculum 
of the compulsory religious courses for the teaching of Alevi belief sand practices? 
 
6) In your opinion, is it possible that the educational policy which aims to eliminate the 
religious, cultural and ideological discrimination against Alevi children in the 
religious courses will lead to the acceptance and recognition of Alevi belief and 
practice in other spaces of public life? (For example, is it possible that influenced by 
the reform in the religious courses, the Directorate of Religious Affairs recognise 
Cemevis, Alevi communion houses, as places of worship and respect the Alevi 
cultural rights within the framework of the Initiative?) 
 
7) Do you think that the Alevi Initiative and the reform on the religious course is a 
process, which begins with the toleration of the teaching of their own religion for 
Alevi children in school, and leads to the recognition of religious and cultural 
differences of Alevi communities and respect for their socio-cultural rights? 
 
8) Could you argue that the demands and claims which are represented by the leaders of 
the Alevi groups involved in the negotiations with the government are sincere in the 
sense that they aim to propagate the recognition/respect of Alevi culture? 
 
9) Can you say that the Alevi Initiative, which is attempted and directed by the AKP 
government, weakens the belief of Alevi groups in its potential for raising tolerance 
toward cultural diversity? 
 
10) Can you tell that the AKP government is genuine and dedicated in its Alevi Initiative? 
Does it only put forth an interim solution, which could encourage the people to 
tolerate religious differences of Alevis in the process of the EU-accession? 
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11) Can you tell us about your view on toleration and acceptance of life styles of different 
religious, cultural and ethnic groups? 
 
12)  Do you think that various political and social actors have recently attempted to raise 
awareness for toleration, recognition of and respect for different religious, cultural and 
ethnic groups in the curriculum of primary and secondary schools? 
 
13) How do you think the most appropriate content should be for the course “Religious 
Culture and Moral Education”? 
 
 Questions for Teachers, Parents and School Principles: 
 
1) There has been an ongoing debate on the curriculum of the Course “Religious Culture 
and Moral Education”. What is your assessment on these debates? 
 
2) What do you think about the compulsory religious courses which are taught by the title 
“Religious Course and Moral Education” in the primary and secondary schools? 
 
3)  Do you approve and accept the way in which “Religious Culture and Moral 
Education” is taught at the present? Do you think that in these courses, students are 
forced to learn religion, and to adopt Islamic belief and practice? 
 
4) Do you believe that in these courses, Alevi and other non-Sunni students are subject to 
humiliation? If so, can you explain how and why? 
 
5) In the case of a student or a parent complains about such a compelling, humiliating or 
insulting behaviour that himself/herself or his/her child is subjected to, how is the 
conflict settled? In such cases, does the personal approach of the teacher, parent or 
school principle make a difference? If so, how?  
 
6) In your opinion, is it possible that the educational policy which aims to eliminate the 
religious, cultural and ideological discrimination against Alevi children in the 
religious courses will lead to the acceptance and recognition of Alevi belief and 
practice in other spaces of public life? (For example, is it possible that influenced by 
the reform in the religious courses, the Directorate of Religious Affairs recognise 
Cemevis, Alevi communion houses, as places of worship and respect the Alevi 
cultural rights within the framework of Initiative?) 
 
7) Do you think that Alevi Initiative and the reform on the religious course is a process, 
which begins with the toleration of the teaching of their own religion for Alevi 
children in schools and leads to the recognition of religious and cultural differences of 
Alevi communities and respect for their socio-cultural rights? 
 
8) Can you tell that the AKP government is genuine and decisive in its Alevi Initiative? 
Does it only put forth an interim solution, which could encourage to tolerate religious 
differences of Alevis, in the process of the EU-accession?  
 
9) Can you tell us about your view on the toleration and acceptance of life styles of 
different religious, cultural and ethnic groups? 
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10) Do you think that various political and social actors have recently attempted to raise 
awareness for toleration, recognition of and respect for different religious, cultural 
and ethnic groups in the curriculum of primary and secondary schools? 
 
11) How do you think the most appropriate content should be for the course “Religious 
Culture and Moral Education”? 
 
 
Question Set 2: The Headscarf Issue in Universities 
 
Questions for Policy Makers, Politicians and National Representative of 
Ethnic/Religious Groups 
 
1) In your opinion, what are the reasons which lie behind the headscarf issue?  
 
2) Do you think that a legal arrangement in the Laws of Higher Education is satisfactory 
for the abolishment of the ban on headscarf in universities? Or, do you think a 
constitutional reform is necessary for the liberation of wearing a headscarf in all 
public institutions? 
 
3)  Can you claim that the lifting the headscarf ban is an instant threat against the 
principle of secularism which separates religious affairs from state affairs?  
 
4) What do you think about the public statement of the Council of Higher Education 
which was sent to the university chancellors and approved the lifting of the headscarf 
ban in universities? 
 
5)   Could you say that the lifting of headscarf ban in universities is only an interim 
solution to the challenges emerging from religious differences? Otherwise, can you 
tell that it is the initial stage of a longer process, which begins with the toleration of 
religious and cultural differences and leads to the recognition by the state of religious 
rights and freedoms with respect to the principle of secularism? 
 
6) What is your opinion about the initiatives that the government and opposition take in 
order to solve the headscarf issue?   
 
7) Can you suggest that without reaching social consensus on tolerating and accepting 
religious differences, a political initiative to solve the headscarf issue taken by the 
political parties and bureaucrats can be decisive and stable? 
 
 
Questions for Teachers, Parents and School Principles: 
 
1) What do you think about the prevention of university students from wearing headscarf 
on university campuses and the expulsion from lecture rooms of those students who 
can enter the campus by wearing a hat on headscarf? 
 
2) In your opinion, what are the reasons which lie behind the headscarf issue?  
 
3) What do you think about the public statement of the Council of Higher Education, 
which  was sent to the university chancellors and approved the lift of the ban on 
wearing a headscarf in universities? 
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4) Can you say that female university students wearing a headscarf support a democratic 
regime, which maintains pluralism, equality and the fundamental rights and liberties, 
or is it possible that they have interests or desires in another way? (For example, what 
do they think about gender equality and women’s rights?) 
 
5)  Can you say that women wearing with headscarf and without headscarf interact with, 
and understand, each other, and are tolerant toward each other? 
 
6)  Do you think that a legal arrangement in the Laws of Higher Education is satisfactory 
for the abolishment of the ban on headscarf in universities? Or, a constitutional 
reform is necessary for the liberation of wearing a headscarf in all public institutions? 
 
7)   Could you say that the lifting of headscarf ban in universities is only an interim 
solution to the challenges emerging from religious differences? Otherwise, can you 
tell that it is the initial stage of a longer process, which begins with the toleration of 
religious and cultural differences and leads to the recognition by the state of religious 
rights and freedoms with respect to the principle of secularism? 
 
8) What is your opinion about the initiatives that the government and opposition take in 
order to solve the headscarf issue?   
 
9) Can you suggest that without reaching social consensus on tolerating and accepting 
religious differences, a political initiative to solve the headscarf issue taken by the 
political parties and bureaucrats can be decisive and stable? 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
